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Family Protection Under Kentucky's
Inheritance Laws: Is the Family Really
Protected?
By CAROLYN S. BRATT*
INTRODUCTION
Courts and legislatures always have granted widows some
protection from the economic hardships that their husbands'
deaths cause.' At the earliest common law, a surviving wife was
entitled to dower in the form of a right to remain in her
husband's home along with the other heirs after the husband's
death.2 By the time of the Magna Carta in 1215, the surviving
wife had a dower right to a life estate in one-third of the real
property of which her husband was seized of an estate of inher-
* 1987 Alumnim Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A., SUNY at Albany,
1965; J.D., Syracuse, 1974. The author gives special recognition to Karen Greenwell,
J.D., University of Kentucky, 1985, for her editorial suggestions and to Scott Wilhoit,
second-year law student, University of Kentucky, for his research.
I A husband had more extensive rights m his wife's property at common law than
a wife had in her husband's property. Upon marriage, the husband had control over all
of his wife's personalty during his life and an estate jure uxorns in all lands of which
his wife was seized of a present freehold estate during the marriage. This estate "by the
marital right" endowed the husband with the right to all the rents and profits from his
wife's land for as long as both parties lived. The husband also had the power to convey
or mortgage Is wife's land for their joint lives without any duty to account to her for
momes he received for the conveyance or mortgage. If issue of the marriage were born
alive, the husband became entitled to curtesy initiate in the lands of which the wife was
seized of an estate of inheritance during the marriage. Curtesy initiate was a larger right
than the estate jure uxoris because it lasted for the husband's life even if his wife
predeceased him. After his wife's death, the husband's life interest in his wife's inher-
itable estates in land was called curtesy consummate. For a general introduction to the
estate by the marital right, see R. CUNNINA i, W STOEBUCK & D. WHrlsAN, THE
LAW OF PROPERTY 77-79 (1984); C. MOYNIEAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 54 (1962). For a thorough discussion of the origin and development of the
concept, see Haskins, The Estate by the Marital Right, 97 U. PA. L. REv 345 (1949).
2 Haskins, The Development of Common Law Dower, 62 HARv. L. Rav 42, 42
(1948).
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itance during the marriage.3 Dower enabled the widow to meet
some of her future support needs, but because dower had to be
"assigned" to the widow, it did not meet her immediate needs
for shelter and sustenance after her husband's death. The rights
of quarantine and estovers developed to bridge this gap m sup-
port between the husband's death and the allotment of the
widow's dower. Quarantine gave the widow the right to remain
in the mansion house for forty days after her husband's death.4
During this interval, the heirs were required to assign the widow
dower. The right of estovers enabled the widow to take reason-
able sustenance from the decedent's property including the right
to kill animals for food during her quarantine.-
Today, the states have enacted a variety of statutory devices
that provide protection for families who ight otherwise expe-
rience financial hardship upon the death of a spouse or parent.
The older types of statutory safeguards take the form of home-
stead and personal property exemptions. Typically, the probate
homestead exemption attempts to protect the decedent's family
by statutorily exempting a portion of the decedent's aggregate
interest in real property used as a permanent residence from
creditors of the estate. 6
The homestead allowance adopted by some states to address
the postmortem financial needs of the decedent's family is the
contemporary counterpart of the homestead exemption. A home-
stead allowance is a dollar allowance which has priority over the
claims of creditors of the decedent's estate and is payable to
1 2 F POLLOCK & F MAnrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISiH LAW 421 (2d ed. 1911).
No one knows why the wife's fractional interest became fixed at one-third. One author
suggests that the development is traceable to ancient Sumena that had a number system
based upon the number three. See McWhnrter, The Ancient Origins of Texas Probate
Law, 49 TEx. B.J. 1060, 1062 (1986).
4 Wyly v. Kallenbach, 76 S.W.2d 34, 36 (Ky. 1934). A contemporary right of
quarantine for surviving spouses has been codified in Kentucky. See KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 392.050 (Bobbs-Merrill 1984) [hereinafter KRS].
W yly, 76 S.W.2d at 36. In lieu of the widow's common law nght of estovers,
KRS § 391.030(I)(c) (1984) grants a $7,500 personalty exemption to the surviving spouse.
6 See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PiAc. L. & R. § 5206 (McKinney 1978). The act benefits
the decedent's surviving spouse and minor children by providing an exemption of a lot
of land with a dwelling thereon not exceeding $10,000 in value from applying to satisfy
a money judgment of the decedent's creditors.
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certain statutorily determined members of the decedent's family 7
The traditional personal property exemption excepts specific
items of tangible personal property used in day to day living
from the claims of the decedent's creditors. 8 Many states have
replaced these statutes with statutes that do not enumerate the
specific items of tangible personal property that are exempt from
the claims of the decedent's creditors. Rather, the statutes permit
certain family members to select articles of tangible personal
property up to a maximum dollar amount from the decedent's
estate free from creditors' claims.9
A number of jurisdictions also augment the traditional family
protection devices with a family allowance. The family allowance
is a monetary award payable by the decedent's personal repre-
sentative, usually without prior court authorization, to certain
members of the decedent's family during the estate admimstra-
tion period.10 The allowance is intended to provide support for
the decedent's family during the estate administration period.
The statutorily created family protection devices not only
take different forms, but they serve a number of different func-
tions. Sometimes, the exemptions and allowances available to
the decedent's surviving spouse and children function both to
protect the recipients from financial hardship after the decedent's
estate has been administered and to provide protection during
the probate process. For example, a family allowance addresses
the inmediate needs of the family following the decedent's death;
See, e.g., UIFoRM PROBATE CODE § 2-401 (1983) [hereinafter UPC] which
awards $5,000 to a surviving spouse. If there is no surviving spouse, the decedent's
minor children are entitled to share the $5,000 allowance equally. "The homestead
allowance is exempt from and has priority over all claims against the estate." Id.
8 See, e.g., 'VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (1984) which exempts, among other things,
the family Bible, wedding and engagement rings, family pictures, schoolbooks, all cats,
dogs, birds, squrrels, rabbits and other pets, I cow, I horse, 6 chairs, 6 plates, 1 table,
12 kmves, 12 forks, 2 dozen spoons, 2 basins, I pot, I oven, 6 pieces, of wooden or
earthenware, I dining room table, I buffet, china press, I icebox, 1 freezer, 1 washing
machine and dryer, I spinning wheel, I pair of cards, 1 axe, 50 bushels of shelled corn,
200 pounds of bacon, 3 hogs, all canned and frozen goods, and I cooking stove.
9 See, e.g., UPC § 2-402 which awards "household furniture, automobiles, fur-
nislungs, appliances and personal effects" not to exceed $3,500 in value to the surviving
spouse, or, if no surviving spouse exists, to the decedent's children.
10 See, e.g., id. at § 2-403 which awards to the surviving spouse and mnor children
a "reasonable allowance in money out of the [decedent's] estate for their maintenance
during the period of administration."
1987-88]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
a homestead allowance, because it is awarded as part of the
final settlement of the decedent's estate, provides the recipients
with a lump sum of money as they enter the post-probate period.
Whether by design or not, all family protection devices also
serve to protect the recipients from total disinheritance by the
decedent.
Kentucky continues to use the homestead exemption as one
mechanism for cushioning the decedent's family from the eco-
nomic impact of the decedent's death.1 A monetary exemption
has been substituted for the traditional personalty exemption of
specific items of tangible personal property The surviving spouse
or the decedent's children, if no surviving spouse exists, receive
an exemption from distribution and sale of personal property,
including money on hand or in a bank, up to the amount of
$7,500.12 Kentucky does not grant a separate family allowance
for the decedent's family, but the surviving spouse is permitted
to receive up to $1,000 of the personalty exemption during the
period of estate administration. 3 The common law right of a
widow to quarantine pending allotment of dower is still available
in Kentucky, but it is awarded without regard to the gender of
the surviving spouse. 14
This Article begins with an exploration and a critique of the
homestead and personalty exemptions currently available in Ken-
tucky 15 Particular attention is given to the limits of these family
protection devices as mechamsms for effectively sheltering the
decedent's family from adverse economic consequences caused
'1 KRS §§ 427.070, .100 (1970 & Supp. 1986).
12 Id. at § 391.030(i)(c).
11 Id. at § 391.030(2).
,4 Id. at § 392.050. The surviving spouse is entitled, from the time of the decedent's
death until dower is allotted, to receive one-half of the rents and profits of the decedent's
real estate. The surviving spouse is also entitled to hold the dwelling house, yard, garden,
stable and lot on which the stable stands, and an orchard until dower is allotted.
1S This Article does not include any discussion of the surviving spouse's right of
quarantine pending allotment of dower. The right of quarantine is a mechanism for
supplying the surviving spouse's immediate needs upon the death of the decedent, and
it also serves as a whip to compel the decedent's intestate takers to arrange for the
allotment of dower to the surviving spouse at the earliest possible moment. Wyly, 76
S.W.2d at 38. Unless, and until, Kentucky eliminates all remnants of common law dower
from the surviving spouse's share, a right of quarantine is still needed regardless of the
type of family protection devices in effect in Kentucky.
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by the decedent's death. This in-depth critique of Kentucky's
family protection devices is followed by a proposed new method
for protecting the decedent's family from financial hardship.
I. KENTUCKY'S HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
A. History and General Nature of the Homestead Exemption
Homestead exemption laws in tis country are not in dero-
gation of the common law, but rather are remnants of the
common law proscription against taking a debtor's land in sat-
isfaction of a debt.1 6 At common law a person's home and
contiguous land were inalienable by the owner and were not
subject to the payment of a creditor's claim. 17 After the pro-
scription against alienation of land was removed, creditors still
could not sell the debtor's land to satisfy a debt. 8 In 1838, a
statute was adopted which permitted the sale of an English
debtor's land to satisfy a creditor's judgment. 9
The Republic of Texas adopted the first homestead law in
this country in 1839.20 Kentucky enacted its homestead law in
1866.21 Today, homestead laws exist in every state except Dela-
ware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, the District of
Columbia and New Jersey.2 Most homestead statutes are de-
signed to protect the debtor's home and family, not to guarantee
the debtor a certain dollar amount of property free from credi-
tors' claims.2 Unlike bankruptcy laws, homestead laws do not
16 For an account of the development of creditor's rights to debtor's property, see
T. PLUCKNETF, A CONCISE HIsToRY oF ra CommoN LAW 369, 370-72 (4th ed. 1949).
,7 Riggs v. Sterling, 27 N.W 705, 707 (Mich. 1886).
' Id.
I 1 & 2 Vict. 949, ch. 110, § 42 (1838).
W'  NuNn, A STUDY OF n TEXAs HoMEmAD AND OTEMR EXEMPTIONS 2 (1931).
21 1865 Ky. Acts 494. The General Assembly passed the Act in December 1865,
and it became effective in February 1866.
2 Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 H.Av. L. Ray. 1289, 1290 & n.10 (1950).
Delaware, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia exempt only chattels from
execution. Maryland and Pennsylvania provide an exemption of $100 and $300 of value,
respectively, in either realty or personalty. Because of the insignificant amount exempted,
these statutory provisions cannot protect the debtor's home. Bratt, Cooperative Apart-
ments: A Survey of Legal Treatment and an Argument for Homestead Protection, 1978
U. ILL. L. FoRum 759, 763 n.17.
3 R. WAPLEs, HommsrEA AND EXEM nON 3 (1892).
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discharge the debtor of her or his liability for debts. The creditor
may prosecute a claim against the debtor, and a court can enter
a judgment against the debtor. The homestead exemption merely
makes the homestead unavailable for satisfaction of the judg-
ment.24 Homestead legislation does not limit its benefits to the
poor. In most states, any person, regardless of financial status,
may claim the protection.Y
Kentucky's homestead legislation 26 is designed to protect the
debtor's home and family 27 During the debtor's lifetime, the
statute provides for an mtervivos homestead. The debtor's ag-
gregate interest, not exceeding $5,000, in real or personal prop-
erty that the debtor or a dependent of such debtor uses as a
permanent residence is "exempt from sale under execution, at-
tachment or judgment.'"' After the debtor's death, the exemp-
tion continues as a probate homestead for the use and benefit
of the debtor's surviving spouse and unmarried infant children.29
Originally, a $1,000 monetary lirmt existed on the value of
the residence protected as a homestead in Kentucky 10 As this
was a generous amount in 1866, Kentucky's homestead exemp-
tion provided meaningful protection both to the debtor while
she or he was alive and thereafter to the debtor's surviving
spouse. However, the limitation on the monetary value of the
homestead remained unchanged until 1980 when it was raised to
$5,000. 11 The increase was not responsive to current economic
conditions. One thousand dollars in 1866 dollars equals almost
$12,000 in 1985.32 Because the increase was really too little, too
late, Kentucky's current homestead exemption does not accom-
plish the essential purpose of all homestead legislation of pro-
24 Id. at 8; see Lear v. Lear, 28 S.W.2d 32 (Ky, 1930) (intervivos homestead is
not an estate but an exemption).
2 Waples, supra note 23, at 3.
26 KRS §§ 427.060-.100 (1970 & Supp. 1986).
"7 Brewer v. Brewer, 105 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Ky. 1937).
2 KRS § 427.060. The exemption may be taken in a burial plot for the debtor or
dependent rather than in property used as a permanent residence.
29 Id. at §§ 427.070, -. 100; Lear, 28 S.W.2d at 33; Russell v. Russell's Assignees,
10 Ky. Op. 470, 471 (1880); Little's Guardian v. Woodward, 77 Ky. 585, 587 0879).
Dig. Gen. Laws Ky. 714 (Clarke Supp. 1865-66).
"1980 Ky. Acts 236, § 4.
32 BuRAu OF THE CENSUs, U.S. DEPT. OF COMIERCE, HIsToRIcAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNTrED STATES: COLoNIL TIMES TO 1970 (1975),
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tecting homes and families. In fact, the homestead exemption is
rarely an issue today in the division of a decedent's estate. The
most recent reported case involving homestead litigation arose
in 1958.11
Kentucky's probate homestead is derived from the debtor's
intervivos homestead.3 4 Therefore, many of the statutory and
caselaw rules for an intervivos homestead exemption burden the
probate homestead even though the probate homestead is in-
tended to protect the debtor's family, not the debtor.
Actual residence on the land is the sine qua non of any claim
to a homestead exemption. The recent amendments to Ken-
tucky's homestead laws35 do not change the longstanding require-
ment that the claimant can only claim the intervivos homestead
in land the claimant actually occupies as a residence. 36 Nor do
they alter the fact that the claimant can only claim the probate
homestead in land the decedent actually occu'i as a residence
at the time of death.37 If the decedent dies seized of property in
which she or he did not reside, the surviving spouse may only
claim dower m that property. 3
By statute, neither the mtervivos nor the probate homestead
exemption prevents the sale of the debtor's residence if the debt
or liability sued upon existed prior to the purchase of the land.39
The person clamung the protection of the homestead exemption
must allege and prove that the debt sued upon arose after the
purchase of the debtor's land.40 The claimant is not required to
reside on the land at the time the debt was contracted as long
as the land was purchased before the liability arose and the
claimant occupies the land at the time the execution is at-
tempted. 41
3 Lunsford v. Witt, 309 S.W.2d 348 (Ky. 1958).
-1 Runyon v. Runyon's Adm'x, 95 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Ky. 1936); Lear, 28 S.W.2d
at 33; Little's Guardian, 77 Ky. at 587-88.
35 KRS § 427.060 (1980 & Supp. 1986).
16 E.g., Moore v. Phillips, 7 Ky. L. Rptr. 221, 221 (1885).
Tinsley v. Tinsley, 235 S.W 730, 731 (Ky. 1921); Dehoney v. Bell, 30 S.W
400, 401 (Ky. 1895); Preston v. Preston, 13 Ky. Op. 507, 507 (1885).
38 Harris v. Howard, 81 S.W 275, 275 (Ky. 1904); Preston, 13 Ky. Op.. at 507-
08.
3' KRS § 427.060 (The homestead exemption "shall not apply if the debt or liability
existed prior to the erection of improvements" on the land.).
- Runyon, 95 S.W.2d at 803.
4" Holder's Adm'r v. Holder, 87 S.W 1100, 1100 (Ky. 1905).
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Even if the property is subject to liability because the debt
existed prior to the acquisition of the land or because the spouses
waived their rights to claim a homestead pursuant to Kentucky
Revised Statute section 427.100 (hereinafter KRS), the surviving
spouse is entitled to a homestead in the decedent's land if
sufficient other security with which to satisfy the debt exists. In
Tillett v Curd,42 the wife mortgaged her land to secure her debt
for money she borrowed from a creditor. Both the wife and
husband executed the note evidencing the debt.43 After the wife's
death, the mortgagee filed suit to foreclose the mortgage. Be-
cause the mortgaged property had sufficient value, the high court
directed a sale of enough of the land to satisfy the decedent's
indebtedness to the mortgagee, and allotted the husband a pro-
bate homestead in the remainder of the tract.
A claimant cannot claim an intervivos or probate homestead
in partnership property By statute, a partner's right in specific
partnership property is not subject to attachment or execution,
except on a claim against the partnership. "Wher partnership
property is attached for a partnership debt the partners, or any
of them, or the representatives of a deceased partner, cannot
claim any right under the homestead or exemption laws.""4
Similarly, "[a] partner's right in specific partnership property is
not subject to dower, curtesy, or allowances to [the surviving
spouse,] heirs or next of kin." '4.
B. Property Interests Sufficient to Support a Homestead
Exemption
The surviving spouse and infant children are not entitled to
a probate homestead unless the decedent was entitled to an
intervivos homestead exemption at death" because the rights of
a surviving spouse and infant children to a probate homestead
42 35 S.W 920, 920 (Ky. 1896).
1' Id., Cf. KRS § 427.100 (1974) (homestead exemption waived if "in writing,
subscribed by the defendant and his spouse, and acknowledged and recorded in the same
manner as conveyances of real estate.").
KRS § 362.270(2)(c) (1987); see Ellis v. Johnson, 12 Ky. Op. 163, 164 (1883).
45 KRS § 362.270(2)(e).
4Runyon, 95 S.W.2d at 803; Higgins v. Higgins, 78 S.W 1124, 1124 (Ky. 1904);
Harpending's Ex'rs v. Wylie, 76 Ky. 158, 162 (1877).
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derives from the decedent's right to an intervivos homestead.
Prior to 1980, only a debtor who was a "bona fide housekeeper
with a family resid[ing] in this state" was eligible to claim an
intervivos homestead. 47 The statutes also expressly limited the
exemption to land.4 However, a 1980 statutory amendment ex-
tended the homestead exemption to any individual debtor re-
gardless of whether the debtor had a family 49 The 1980 statutory
amendment also authorized a homestead exemption in either real
or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor
used as a permanent residence. 50 Thus, a single debtor's interest
in her or his mobile home now fals within the statutory defi-
ration of an intervivos homestead.
Even with this expanded statutory defimtion, the homestead
statutes do not define the nature or quantum of the property
interest that a claimant must possess to support a claim of an
intervivos homestead in real or personal property that the debtor
uses as a permanent residence. Case law does establish that the
claimant need not have a present possessory fee simple absolute
interest in the property to claim the intervivos exemption. 51 Any
present possessory freehold estate, including the life estate, should
be sufficient.52 Of course, if the intervivos homestead is in prop-
erty the debtor holds as a life tenant, no property interest would
exist in which the surviving spouse and infant children could
claim a probate homestead after the debtor's death.
Although no Kentucky cases deal with this issue directly,
other states uniformly recogmze that the owner of an estate for
years can claim the intervivos homestead protection regardless
of whether the term of the lease is one year or one hundred
years. 53 The tenant's right to an intervivos homestead exemption
-7 KRS § 427.060 (1970).
48 Id.
11 1980 Ky. Acts 236 § 4.
50 Id.
Howard v. Mitchell, 105 S.W.2d 128, 134 (Ky. 1937).
,See Suter v. Quarles, 58 S.W 990 (Ky. 1900) (Surviving husband was entitled
to an intervivos homestead in land in which he had a life estate as tenant by curtesy.);
Robinson v. Smithey, 80 Ky. 636 (1883)(life estate).
," For a list of cases from other jurisdictions regarding leaseholds, see Annotation,
Estate or Interest in Real Property to Which a Homestead Claim May Attach, 74
A.L.R.2d 1355, 1378 (1960) [hereinafter Annotation, A.L.R.2d]; Annotation, Estate or
Interest in Real Property to Which a Homestead Claim May Attach, 89 A.L.R. 511,
555-56 (1934) [hereinafter Annotation, A.L.R.].
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does not extend beyond the lease term.54 If the lease extends
beyond the tenant's death, several states have permitted the
surviving spouse and minor children to claim a probate home-
stead in the unexpired leasehold.5 The argument against such a
result rests on the techmcal classification of a leasehold interest
as personal, not real, property As some homestead statutes are
limited to preserving a homestead only in land, a demal of a
homestead exemption in a leasehold interest may be techically
correct. As Kentucky's newly amended homestead statutes spe-
cifically permit the exemption in both real and personal property
the debtor uses as a permanent residence, 56 this problem is
avoided.
Some courts have permitted intervivos homesteads in a resi-
dence occupied under an estate from period to period.57 There
are conflicting decisions in other states dealing with whether the
estate at will or at sufferance are property interests sufficient to
support a claim for an intervivos homestead.58 Because neither
of these rather ephemeral nonfreehold interests survive the ten-
ant's death, no interest exists in land or personalty in which a
surviving spouse or infant child could claim a probate home-
stead.
A future interest is an insufficient basis for claiming an
intervivos homestead. 59 The rationale articulated by Kentucky's
ighest court for this rule is that any other rule would permit
two persons, the owner of the present estate and the owner of
the future interest, each to have a homestead in the same land
at the same time. 60 Most state courts reach the same result but
predicate their decisions on the idea that a present right to
occupy the property is essential in making a homestead claim.
When property ownership is divided between a present estate
Miller v. Farmers' State Bank, 279 P 351, 353 (Okla. 1929).
15 See Stombaugh v. Morey, 58 N.E.2d 545 (Ill. 1944). Contra Moncur v. Jones,
31 N.W.2d 759 (S.D. 1948).
-KRS § 427.060.
57 In re Foley, 97 F Supp. 843 (D. Neb. 1951) (oral month-to-month lease).
1S See Annotation, A.L.R.2d, supra note 53, at 1379; Annotation, A.L.R., supra
note 53, at 588-60.
19 People's Bank of Shepherdsville v Kulmer, 159 S.W 809, 811 (Ky.
1913)(reversion).
60 Id.
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and one or more future interests, the future interest owners have
no present right or claim to occupy the property while the present
estate continues. 6'
Equitable, rather than legal, title can be sufficient to support
a claim of a homestead exemption. For example, a purchaser-
debtor's interest under a purchase contract, or title bond, that
gave the vendee a present right of possession can be sufficient
to support the probate homestead claim of the vendee's surviving
spouse against most creditors of the purchaser-debtor. However,
the homestead exemption does not preclude the seller from sub-
jecting the land to payment of the unpaid purchase money 62
If the land is occupied but not fully paid for prior to the
creation of the debt sued on, the land is liable to the extent of
purchase money paid after the debt's creation. 63 Similarly, the
homestead exemption does not apply if the debt existed before
improvements were built on the land.64 The homestead exemp-
tion does protect the debtor's or the debtor's surviving spouse's
investment in improvements and purchase money paid before
the creation of debts sued on by the creditor. 65 For example,
assume the purchaser-debtor contracted to purchase a residence
for $9,000 and paid $6,000 on the purchase price prior to cre-
ating another debt. After creating the second debt, the debtor
paid the vendor the remaimng $3,000 of the purchase price. As
the debtor's interest in the land at the time the second-debt was
created was equal to or greater than $5,000, the value of the
homestead exemption, the debtor or the debtor's surviving spouse
and infant children may use the entire amount of the homestead
exemption if the second creditor sues them. Conversely, if the
purchaser-debtor had only paid $3,000 on the purchase price
prior to creating the second debt, only $3,000 of homestead
protection is available in an action by the second creditor.
61 Keesee v. Bushart, 158 S.W.2d 915, 916 (Ark. 1942)(contingent remainder); Cross
v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 93 N.W.2d 233, 236-37 (Mich. 1958)(vested remainder); Gulf
Prod. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 61 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933)(possibility
of reverter).
Persifull v. Hind, 11 S.W 15, 16 (Ky. 1889); KRS § 427.060.
6, Mosely v. Bevins, 15 S.W 527, 528 (Ky. 1891). Mosely expressly overruled the
contrary holding in Griffin v, Proctor's Ad'mr, 77 Ky. 571 (1879) that a homestead is
exempt from the payment of unpaid purchase money.
" KRS § 427.060.
Darnel v. Smith's Ex'x, 32 S.W 745, 745-46 (Ky. 1895).
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Although no Kentucky cases are on point, other courts have
found that a beneficiary's equitable interest in a trust when
coupled with occupancy of the trust property is sufficient to
support an intervivos homestead exemption for the beneficiary 6
The trustee's legal title without any beneficial interest in an
express or implied trust cannot support a claim for a homestead
exemption. In Rivers v Morris,67 a wife and husband were
named trustees of certain land for their infant children until all
the children reached the age of twenty-one. The husband there-
after died and the wife remarried. After the wife died, her second
husband claimed a probate homestead in the land that was the
subject matter of the trust. The court determined that the trustee-
wife did not have an interest in the land at her death sufficient
to support her second husband's claim to a probate homestead 8
Kentucky follows the general rule that naked possession,
without any title, is sufficient to support a homestead claim as
against all the world except the true owner or one having better
title.69 In Howard v Mitchell,70 the surviving spouse was entitled
to a probate homestead in land the decedent had adversely
possessed for eight years prior to the decedent's death. The
surviving spouse's subsequent possession of the land by virtue
of her probate homestead was tacked onto the decedent's eight
years of adverse possession to satisfy the statutory penod and
perfect title to the land subject to the surviving spouse's home-
stead in the remainder takers.
A probate homestead may be claimed in the decedent's in-
terest in land that the decedent occupied with the claimant as
tenants in common. In Sams v Sampson,71 the surviving hus-
band and his deceased wife had owned and occupied land to-
gether as tenants in common each with an undivided one-half
66 See 1 A. ScoTT, Tim LAW OF TRUSTS § 149 (1939).
67 78 S.W 196 (Ky. 1904).
' Id. at 197; see Wilson v. Campbell, 20 S.W 609, 609 (Ky. 1892)(rejected the
use of parol evidence by heirs of first wife who tried to-establish that the land the
decedent occupied and held in his own name at death was actually held by him m trust
for his first wife and not available as a homestead for his second wife).
Howard, 105 S.W.2d at 133-34.
70 105 S.W.2d 128, 133-34 (Ky. 1936).
255 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Ky. 1953).
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interest. As the surviving spouse, the husband was entitled to
elect homestead in his wife's undivided one-half interest.
The surviving spouse's right to claim a probate homestead
in the deceased spouse's interest in jointly held property does
not mature into a legal right until the spouse's death. In Lear
v Lear,72 a husband and wife jointly owned and resided on
property worth less than the homestead exemption amount. The
spouses separated and the wife brought an action for a sale of
the jointly owned property and the division of the proceeds of
the sale. The husband alleged that his right to claim a probate
homestead in his wife's interest in the joint property, if he
survived her, precluded her from forcing a sale of the jointly
owned property The court entered a judgment against the hus-
band because the surviving spouse's right to claim a probate
homestead m the deceased spouse's interest in jointly held prop-
erty does not create an estate or vested interest in the other
spouse's property during their joint lifetime.7 3
Respecting the theory that courts should construe liberally
the homestead exemption to fulfill its beneficial purpose of
protecting the debtor's home and family,74 Kentucky's highest
court has held that a person can claim a probate homestead in
a separate but contiguous tract of land which the decedent uses
in connection with the tract of land occupied as a residence.7 5
In Buckler v Brown,7 6 a wife and husband each owned separate
tracts of contiguous land. Their house was located on the wife's
tract, but they cultivated and used the husband's tract in con-
nection with their residence on the wife's land. As the spouses
regarded, cultivated, and claimed the two separate parcels of
land as one tract, the court treated them as one for the purpose
of the widow's probate homestead m her deceased husband's
28 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. 1930).
" Id. at 33.
74 Brewer, 105 S.W.2d at 584.
-' Farmer v. Hampton, 156 S.W 1041, 1042-43 (Ky. 1913) (probate homestead in
separate, non-contiguous tracts of land); Holder's Adm'r, 87 S.W at 1100 (probate
homestead in separate tract of land contiguous to the tract the spouses rented and lived
on); Buckler v. Brown, 39 S.W 509, 509 (Ky.) (probate homestead in separate, but
contiguous, tracts of land), reh'g denied, 39 S.W 825 (Ky. 1897).
76 39 S.W 509, reh'g denied, 39 S.W 825 (Ky. 1897).
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tract of land.77 Of course, the value of the two tracts cannot
exceed the homestead amount of $5,000.78
C. Homestead Claimants
Prior to the 1980 amendments to Kentucky's homestead sta-
tutes, only a claimant who was a "bona fide housekeeper with
a family resid[ing] in [the] state" could claim the intervivos
homestead. 79 Currently, the intervivos exemption is available to
any "individual debtor.''80 Therefore, those cases dealing with
the effect of the subsequent death or removal of the housekee-
per's family from the homestead on the claimant's right to an
intervivos homestead are no longer relevant.8 1
Although the probate homestead exemption initially was lim-
ited to widows,82 today the exemption is available to either a
surviving wife or husband.8 3 As long as the decedent was entitled
to a homestead in land she or he owned at death, that right
passes to the decedent's surviving spouse. 84 The surviving spouse
who claims the homestead exemption must share the right of
occupancy with the decedent's minor children,8 but the surviving
spouse may claim homestead even when there are no children.8 6
A surviving spouse's separation from the decedent at the time
of the death does not affect the survivor's right to homestead.8
However, if the surviving spouse was separated from the dece-
dent and living in adultery when the decedent died, the offender
would have no right or interest, including no claim to homestead,
77 Id., see Mason v. Columbia Fin. & Trust Co., 35 S.W 115, 115 (Ky. 1896)
(intervivos homestead permitted in contiguous, but separately owned, tracts of land).
79 KRS § 427.060.
79 Id., Foreman v. Cook, 127 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Ky. 1939); Brewer, 105 S.W.2d at
583.
,o KRS § 427.060.
" E.g., Eastern State Hosp. v. Cottle, 256 S.W 1101 (Ky. 1924); Redmond's
Adm'x v. Redmond, 66 S.W 745 (Ky. 1902).
Littler's Guardian, 77 Ky. at 587.
83 KRS §§ 427.070, 
-. 100.
, See Ritter v. Huffman, 50 S.W 1101 (Ky. 1899); Crigler v. Connor, 11 S.W
202 (Ky. 1889); Gavin v. Sanders, 12 Ky. Op. 280 (1883).
-5 KRS § 427.070(l).
86 Ellis v. Davis, 14 S.W 74, 75 (Ky. 1890); Eustache v. Rodaquest, 74 Ky. 42,
46 (1874); Gasaway v. Woods, 72 Ky. 72, 74 (1872).
Redmond's Adm'x, 66 S.W at 746.
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in the decedent's property 88 The birth of an out-of-wedlock
child to the surviving widow four years after the decedent's
death does not constitute adultery or a bar to the widow's right
to homestead.8 9
As originally enacted in 1866, Kentucky's probate homestead
statute applied to the decedent's children without any reference
to the child claimant's age.9° That original probate homestead
exemption is codified today in KRS section 427.100. Although
the statute is now phrased in terms of the decedent's "surviving
spouse," without reference to the surviving spouse's gender, it
continues to refer to the decedent's "children." Nonetheless, the
homestead exemption is actually only available to the decedent's
unmarried "infant" children. 91 In 1873, the legislature adopted
an additional probate homestead provision specifically limited
to the surviving wife or husband and the decedent's "unmarried
infant children." 92 The 1873 homestead exemption is codified in
KRS section 427.070. Kentucky's highest court has consistently
restricted the duration of the children's occupancy of the probate
homestead to their infancy and interpreted KRS section 427.070
as a limitation on the probate homestead referred to in section
427. 100.93
The Kentucky courts never have expressly decided whether
the infant children's homestead continues as a common interest
to all the children until the youngest child reaches the age of
majority or applies only to the infant children as the older
children :ome of age. 94 The court has determined that when
several children are entitled to a homestead, a creditor cannot
complain because those arriving at eighteen remain in the home-
stead with the underage children. 95 Infant children may assert
their continuing right to occupy the homestead against the de-
KRS § 392.090(2) (1984).
Farmer, 156 S.W at 1043.
"Little's Guardian, 77 Ky. at 586.
11 KRS § 427.070.
Little's Guardian, 77 Ky. at 586.
93 Id. at 587-88; Loyd v. Loyd, 6 Ky. L. Rptr. 551, 554 (1885).
14 Miller v. Mills, 7 Ky. L. Rptr. 221, 224 (1885) (court expressly refused to decide
issue).
" Lawrence v. Lawrence's Adm'r, 10 Ky. Op. 353 (1879). Since this decision, the
age of majority has changed from 21 to 18.
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cedent's adult children as well as against the decedent's creditors
who want the land sold.96
The fact that the decedent's infant children were not living
with the decedent at the time the decedent died does not deprive
the children of their homestead right.97 The infant children may
use their homestead exemption even though a parent is not alive
to claim it with them. 98
D. Claims Barred by the Homestead Exemption
During the debtor's lifetime, the mtervivos homestead ex-
emption protects the debtor's residence, not exceeding $5,000 in
value, from sale under execution, attachment or judgment. 99 The
creditor may enforce any rightful claim against the debtor's other
assets, but the creditor cannot use the debtor's residence to
satisfy the debt. After the debtor's death, the residence remains
immune from the creditors' claims because the exemption con-
tinues for the benefit of the debtor's surviving spouse and infant
children. 00 The probate homestead protects the residence from
both claims proved by creditors in an action to settle the estate
of the decedent and against executions, attachments or judg-
ments of creditors who perfected their claims during the dece-
dent-debtor's lifetime. 1°1
Regardless of whether the decedent has any creditors, the
surviving spouse and infant children also may use the probate
homestead exemption against the decedent's heirs. Thus, if a
spouse and adult children survive the decedent, the adult children
would inherit the decedent's property subject to the surviving
spouse's right to the probate homestead exemption in the dece-
dent's property used as a residence. 0 2
Loyd, 6 Ky. L. Rptr. at 555.
" Potter v. Redmon's Guardian, 96 S.W 529, 530 (Ky. 1906) (children were living
with their mother's kindred at their father's death); Dillard v. Hunt, 7 Ky. Op. 625
(1874) (children were placed in an orphanage after their surviving parent's death).
" Loyd, 6 Ky. L. Rptr. at 554; Little's Guardian, 77 Ky. at 587.
- KRS § 427.070.
'I- Id., id. at § 427.100.
0I Myers' Guardian v. Meyers' Administrator, 12 S.W 933 (Ky. 1890).
'92 See Lancaster v. Redding, 26 S.W 1013, 1014 (Ky. 1894) (homestead exemption
awarded to surviving spouse m land decedent's adult child, a stepchild of the surviving
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Because the homestead exemption gives the surviving spouse
and infant children the right to control and occupy the residence,
their occupancy of the land is not adverse or hostile to the heirs
who inherited the property subject to the homestead rights of
the spouse and infant children. 103 Mere occupancy of the land
by one entitled to a probate homestead exemption, regardless of
the duration, will not permit the homestead claimant to acquire
title by adverse possession as against the decedent's heirs. 104
However, the surviving spouse or infant children's permissive or
rightful possession pursuant to the probate homestead in the
decedent's land can be converted into adverse possession. 0 5 To
convert the homestead claimant's rightful possession into pos-
session adverse to the decedent's heirs, the homestead claimant
must clearly and unequivocally repudiate the heirs' interest.106
The homestead claimant must assert possession based on the
claimant's own right and not by virtue of the homestead exemp-
tion. In Smith v Richey,i07 the surviving spouse lived on the
land for almost fifty years after the decedent's death. During
her occupancy, the widow referred to the land as her own and
sold trees from the land. Her actions, however, were insufficient
to convert her rightful possession as a probate homestead claim-
ant into adverse possession against the heirs who had inherited
the land subject to her homestead rights.10 8
As discussed previously in this Article, claimants cannot raise
the homestead exemption against the claims of certain of the
decedent's creditors. KRS section 427.060 expressly provides that
the exemption does not apply in a proceeding to foreclose a
mortgage given by the owner of the homestead land or for
purchase money due thereon. The statute further provides that
spouse, inherited); Loyd, 82 Ky. at 526 (homestead exemption awarded to infant children
in land they inherited with decedent's adult children); Eustache, 74 Ky. at 46 (homestead
awarded to surviving spouse in land inherited by decedent's sister); Gasaway, 72 Ky. at
74 (homestead awarded to surviving spouse in land decedent's collateral heirs inherited).
' Carter v. Monarch, 188 S.W 379, 379 (Ky. 1916).
,14 Smith v. Richey, 215 S.W 429, 430 (Ky. 1919)(surviving spouse did not acquire
title to homestead property by adverse possession after occupying the land for 47 years
after decedent's death).
1*1 R. CUNNINGIHA, W STOEBUCK & D. WmrarmN, supra note 1, at 762.
306 Id. at 758.
10- 215 S.W 429 (Ky. 1919).
,01 Id. at 430.
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the exemption does not apply if the debt or liability existed prior
to the purchase of the land or the erection of the improvements
thereon. However, the debtor need not have resided on the land
at the time she or he contracted the debt to qualify for the
homestead exemption. As long as the land was purchased before
the liability arose and the claimant occupied the homestead when
the creditor attempted to subject the land to payment of the
debt, the homestead exemption applies.? 9 Even if the property
is subjected to liability because the debt preceded the debtor's
acquisition of the land or because the spouses waived their
probate homestead rights in the land, the surviving spouse nev-
ertheless may claim a homestead m the land if the decedent left
sufficient other property to satisfy the debt."0
If the land is not fully paid for before the debtor creates the
debt sued on, the land is liable to the extent of purchase money
paid after the debt was created."' Similarly, the homestead
exemption does not protect the value of improvements erected
on the property after the debt sued on was created."2 Conversely,
the homestead exemption does protect the debtor as well as the
debtor's surviving spouse and infant children to the extent of
the amounts not exceeding $5,000 paid on the purchase price or
the value of improvements made before the debtor created the
debt." 3
E. Time for Claiming the Homestead Exemption
A majority of the states do not require a formal homestead
declaration to secure the exemption. In those states, the clai-
mant's occupancy or notice to specified persons of a homestead
claim at the time of levy or sale of the property is sufficient to
establish the exemption." 4 In Kentucky, the claimant need not
119 Holder's Adm'r, 87 S.W at 1100.
110 Tillett, 35 S.W at 920.
II Mosely, 15 S.W at 528. Contra Griffin, 77 Ky. at 571 (A homestead in land
held under title and bond is not waived by a mortgage in wluch the wife did not join.
Such a homestead cannot be subjected to debt payment created after the land's purchase
but before it was paid for or conveyed to the purchaser.).
11 KRS § 427.060.
113 Darnell, 32 S.W at 746.
114 Haskins, supra note 22 at 1312.
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assert or claim the exemption until a creditor seeks to use the
property to satisfy a debt." 5 In First National Bank of Jackson
v Oliver,1 6 a father made an mtervivos gratuitous transfer of
his residence to his son. At the time of the transfer, the father's
creditors could not have used the residence to satisfy any debts
he owed them because the residence was worth less than the
amount that the homestead statutes exempted. After the father's
death, his creditors attempted to set aside the transfer and to
use the land to satisfy debts the father had incurred before he
transferred the property. Because the father's intervivos home-
stead exemption created an exemption for the land when the
transfer occurred," 7 the court allowed the son to keep the land
even though the father had not claimed the mtervivos homestead
exemption during his lifetime.
In In re Gibson,"8 the court allowed the surviving spouse of
a debtor who had been adjudged a bankrupt prior to death to
claim either dower or a probate homestead in the proceeds of
the sale of the debtor's home. The trustee m a bankruptcy
proceeding had sold the debtor's interest in the home before the
debtor died. Under KRS section 427.090, the debtor could have
claimed an amount equal to the homestead exemption from the
proceeds of the trustee's sale as exempt property for purposes
of purchasing another homestead. The debtor could have as-
serted this right at any time before a final order disposing of
the property was entered." 9 The debtor died without making
such a claim. The debtor's failure to claim the intervivos ex-
emption in the bankruptcy proceeding did not preclude the sur-
vivmg spouse from claiming the surviving spouse's probate
homestead m the exempt proceeds from the sale of the residence
in the incompleted bankruptcy proceeding.120 Because the home-
stead exemption only provides the surviving spouse with a right
" First Nat'l Bank of Jackson v. Oliver, 150 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Ky. 1941).
16 150 S.W.2d 894 (Ky. 1941).
KRS § 427.060.
" 33 F Supp. 838 (E.D. Ky. 1940).
"' First Nat'l Bank of Scottsville v. Duncan, 276 S.W 848, 848 (Ky. 1925) (debtor
entitled to homestead in proceedings arising from the sale of property to pay debts and
could assert such right at any time before a final order disposing of such proceeds
occurs).
11 In re Gibson, 33 F Supp. at 840.
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to enjoy the exempted land for life, the surviving spouse m In
re Gibson received only the income from a court-ordered in-
vestment of the exempt fund. The claimant may apply for and
obtain the probate homestead at any time before the decedent's
estate is distributed.12 1
F Valuation and Allotment of the Homestead Exemption
Neither the debtor's probate homestead nor the intervivos
homestead of the surviving spouse and infant children can exceed
$5,000 in value.122 A specific statutory procedure exists for val-
uing and allotting an ntervivos homestead. KRS section 427.080
provides that two disinterested housekeepers of the county must
value and set apart the debtor's homestead for the debtor. The
court selects these appraisers. If they disagree about the land's
value, the officer making the sale acts as an umpire. The ap-
praisers must record in writing the valuation of the debtor's land
occupied as a residence, sign the writing, and return the writing
to the court.
The value of the decedent's residence must also be established
when the surviving spouse elects to take the probate homestead
exemption. However, no express statutory method exists for
valuing and allotting the probate homestead. Case law does
establish that the value of the decedent's residence for purposes
of the probate homestead is a question of fact.i2 On appeal,
the court will not disturb the trial court's determination of value
unless it is apparent from the record that the judgment is not
supported by the weight of the evidence. 1- The claimant can
establish the value of the decedent's residence through testimony
of landowners in the area, through testimony of those engaged
in buying and selling land, and through other experts.2-  A
witness must possess actual knowledge upon which to base her
12, Wilson's Adm'r v. Wilson, 156 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Ky. 1941) (The homestead
right was the right of exemption for the benefit of the debtor and the deceased debtor's
widow and infant children and could be applied at any time before the property's
proceeds were distributed.).
M KRS §§ 427.060, .070, .100.
2 See, e.g., Farmer, 156 S.W at 1041.
'1 Id. at 1042.
12 Id.
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or his opinion of the value of the residence. Otherwise, the
witness is incompetent to establish the homestead's value on the
date of death. 126
In valuing the decedent's residence for probate homestead
purposes, the surviving spouse's interest in the land as a con-
current owner with the decedent does not count. 127 For example,
assume that the decedent had an undivided one quarter interest
in the family residence as a tenant in common with the surviving
spouse who had an undivided three quarters interest in the land.
Also, assume that the total value of the residence was $20,000
at the time of the decedent's death. The decedent's concurrent
interest is worth $5,000 (one-quarter of $20,000) while the sur-
viving spouse's individual interest is worth $15,000 (three-quar-
ters of $20,000). The surviving spouse is entitled to a probate
homestead in the decedent's entire interest because the decedent's
interest does not exceed the permssible homestead limit of $5,000.
If the value of the decedent's interest in the property used
as a residence is less than the $5,000 exemption, the surviving
spouse does not get to make up the deficiency from the dece-
dent's property not occupied as a residence during the decedent's
life.12S
The surviving spouse and minor children receive the probate
homestead exemption without reference to the kind or to the
value of other property they may possess in their own right. 29
The source of their separate property is also irrelevant in fixing
their homestead rights.' 30 Thus, if the decedent makes an inter-
vivos gift of property to the surviving spouse, the value of the
gift is not counted in determining the surviving spouse's probate
homestead. '3
11 Shields v. Parsons, 18 S.W.2d 961, 962 (Ky. 1929) (deceased's daughter's testi-
mony that she thought the homestead was worth a certain amount without showing her
knowledge of the value was incompetent to prove the homestead's value).
2 Miles v. Hall, 75 Ky. 105 (1876).
I Id. at 109.
"2 Taylor v. Shelton, 13 S.W.2d 506, 506 (Ky. 1929) (surviving spouse's ownership
of another piece of property suitable for a residence immaterial in determimng the
surviving spouse's right to a probate homestead in the decedent's land used as a
residence).
I Sansbery v. Simms' Adm'x, 3 Ky. L. Rptr. 303, 305-06 (1881).
131 Id.
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If property allocated to the surviving spouse and infant
children as a probate homestead thereafter increases to a value
greater than the exempted amount of $5,000, the decedent's
creditors and heirs cannot reach the excess value until the pro-
bate homestead ends. 32 In Turner's Guardian v Turner's Heirs,'33
the residence of an insolvent decedent was worth only $1,000
(the amount of the homestead exemption at the time of the case)
when it was allotted to the decedent's infant children. Thereafter,
the infant children's guardian, with the court's permission, di-
vided the land into town lots and sold the lots for $5,400. The
court permitted the children to enjoy the use of the interest on
all of the sale's proceeds until the youngest child reached the
age of majority When the youngest child reached the age of
majority, the entire principal was distributed to the decedent's
creditors.
The intervivos homestead exemption prevents the sale of the
debtor's residence, either absolutely or subject to the debtor's
occupancy, if the land is worth no more than the statutory
amount of $5,000.Y4 If the debtor's residence is worth more
than the $5,000 statutory exemption, the debtor receives a home-
stead not to exceed $5,000 before the remainder of the land is
available to the creditors. The creditors may force a sale of all
the land the debtor used as a residence only if the value of the
land exceeds the $5,000 exemption and the land cannot be di-
vided without greatly reducing its value. In such a situation,
however, the debtor must receive $5,000 of the proceeds of the
sale to enable the debtor to purchase another homestead,' 35
In keeping with the purpose of a homestead exemption to
secure a home to the debtor and the debtor's family, under the
probate homestead an actual homestead for the use of the sur-
viving spouse and infant children should be allocated whenever
practicable.136 If the decedent's residence is worth less than $5,000,
the heirs cannot force a sale of the residence and a division of
the proceeds between the heirs and the decedent's surviving
t3 Turner's Guardian v. Turner's Heirs, 13 S.W 6, 7 (Ky. 1890).
13 13 S.W 6 (Ky. 1890).
"4 KRS § 427.090; see Taylor v. Loller's Ex'rs, 3 S.W 165, 166 (Ky. 1887).
"s KRS § 427.090.
16 Thompson v. Thompson's Adm'r, 105 S.W 1185, 1187 (Ky. 1907).
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spouse and infant children. 37 When the residence's value exceeds
the statutory amount, the law favors the physical partition of
the land to permit the actual setting off of the residence to the
spouse and infant children rather than a sale of the land and a
division of its proceeds between the decedent's heirs and the
decedent's surviving spouse and infant children.138 The dece-
dent's heirs can force a sale of the land and a division of the
proceeds only if the property used as a residence is worth more
than $5,000 and an actual homestead in favor of the surviving
spouse and infant children cannot be set off without greatly
reducing the value of the property.1 39
The probate homestead statute expressly provides that the
decedent's land may be sold, subject to the rights of the surviving
spouse and infant children, "if a sale is necessary to pay the
debts of the decedent."' 14° This statutory grant of power to sell
the decedent's residence if necessary to pay the debts of the
decedent is not expressly limited to the sale of a residence valued
at more than $5,000. However, in Dillard v Hunt, 4' Kentucky's
highest court held that the probate homestead cannot be sold at
the instance of the decedent's creditors unless the property will
bring a price exceeding the statutory exemption.
If the decedent's residence is sold subject to the surviving
spouse or infant children's probate homestead, the cost of the
sale is subtracted from the proceeds of the sale, and then the
claimants' homestead rights are allocated from the remaimng
proceeds.' 42 The court has a number of options when allocating
the probate homestead to the surviving spouse and infant chil-
dren. The court may direct the investment of $5,000 for the use
of the surviving spouse for life and for the infant children during
their minority '43 The claimant may receive the entire statutory
Anderson's Adm'r v. Creekmore, 287 S.W 941, 942 (Ky. 1926).
Taylor, 13 S.W.2d at 506; Duff v. Duff, 140 S.W 540, 541 (Ky. 1911).
Duff, 140 S.W at 540.
140 KRS § 427.070(i) (emphasis added); see National Loan & Bldg. Ass'n No. I of
Newport v. Maloney, 60 S.W 12, 13 (Ky. 1900) (sale of deceased debtor's homestead
subject to widow and infant children's occupancy); Schmidt v. Oliges, 12 Ky. Op. 756
(1884); Russell, 10 Ky. Op. at 470 (when owner dies, heirs can sell homestead to pay
debts).
14 7 Ky. Op. 625, 627 (1874).
,,2 Mangrum v. Mangrum, 287 S.W 532, 534 (Ky. 1926).
,,1 Sansbery, 3 Ky. L. Rptr. at 307.
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amount of $5,000, and the court may require bond with good
security for its return to the heirs at the claimant's death. 144
Finally, the court may direct that the claimant receive absolutely
the present value of the claimant's interest in the $5,000.145
G. Waiver of the Homestead Exemption
KRS section 427.100 provides the only method for the vol-
untary mortgaging, releasing, or waiving of the homestead ex-
emption. The mortgage, release, or waiver must be in writing,
and the debtor and the debtor's spouse must subscribe the writ-
ing. The document must be acknowledged and recorded in the
same manner as are conveyances of real estate. 146
In Carr v Britton,147 the spouses mortgaged property used
as their residence to obtain a loan. Both spouses properly signed,
acknowledged, and recorded the mortgage instrument, but it did
not contain any express reference to the mortgagor's homestead.
The mortgagor and the mortgagor's spouse sought to have an
intervivos homestead in the land set aside for them after the
mortgage was foreclosed upon the theory that the waiver pro-
visions of KRS section 427.100 only apply to mortgages in which
the homestead exemption is expressly waived. The court deter-
mined that the homestead exemption could be waived by impli-
cation. If the language of the mortgage instrument, whether in
the warranty or elsewhere, evidences the mortgagors' intention
to convey their entire interest in their lands, the claimants have
waived the homestead 48 However, if the surviving spouse joined
I "Id.
14S Mangrum, 287 S.W at 553. (Forty year old surviving spouse was given the
present value of her life estate in $1,000, the statutory amount at the time of this case.);
Sansbery, 3 Ky. L. Rptr. at 307.
"6 Hensey v. Hensey's Adm'r, 17 S.W 333, 334 (Ky. 1891) (A mortgage executed
and delivered by both spouses releasing their homestead claims is not sufficient if it is
not recorded.).
1- 103 S.W.2d 300 (Ky. 1937).
Id. at 303; see Arnett v. Salyersville Nat'l Bank, 46 S.W.2d 124 (Ky. 1931)
(husband and wife's mortgage conveying entire estate with warranty covenant held
sufficient to relinquish homestead right although did not specifically mention homestead);
Bray v. Elison, 83 S.W 96 (Ky. 1904); Hays v. Froman, 45 S.W 87 (Ky. 1898) (an
instrument purporting to convey the wife's entire estate also creates a waiver of her
homestead exemption).
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in the mortgage with the decedent only for the purpose of
releasing dower, the spouse has not waived the probate home-
stead. 49
As spouses cannot waive their homestead exemptions except
as provided in KRS section 427.100,150 the surviving spouse is
not affected by the decedent's unilateral waiver of the intervivos
homestead exemption. The nonwaiving surviving spouse may
claim the probate homestead in the family residence after the
waiving spouse dies.' Although a mortgage given by the dece-
dent without the joinder of the surviving spouse does not defeat
the surviving spouse's probate homestead m the property, an
mtervivos sale of the land by the decedent defeats the spouse's
right to later claim a probate homestead in that land. 52 Even if
the surviving spouse joins with the decedent in the mortgage of
the family's land, the surviving spouse has the right, after the
decedent's death, to use and to occupy so much of the land as
represents the homestead until the land is sold under a judgment
enforcing the mortgage lien. 53 Similarly, a surviving spouse who
joins in the mortgage of the homestead land is entitled to a
homestead exemption in surplus proceeds left after satisfaction
of the mortgage. 154
KRS section 427.100 does not provide for a homestead waiver
by the decedent's infant children. The absence of an express
statutory waiver provision for infant children has been construed
to constitute a legislative determination that infants are barred
from waiving their homestead rights. 15
H. Forfeiture of the Homestead Exemption-By Intervivos
Conveyance
An mtervivos conveyance of the debtor's residence does not
end the intervivos homestead. If the property is worth less than
141 Kiesewetter v. Kress, 68 S.W 633, 635 (Ky. 1902); cf. Bloch v. Tarrent's Adm'r,
91 S.W 275 (Ky. 1906).
Lawrence, 10 Ky. Op. at 355.
I Potter v. Potter's Receiver, 101 S.W 905, 908 (Ky. 1907) (surviving spouse did
not sign decedent's deed of assignment for the benefit of decedent's creditors).
112 Pugh v. Pugh, 130 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Ky. 1939); Hanna's Assignee's v. Gay, 78
S.W 915, 916-17 (Ky. 1904); Gullett v. Arnett, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 1892 (1898).
0' Hersperger v. Smith, 16 Ky. L. Rptr. 61 (1894).
Im McTaggert v. Smith, 77 Ky. 414 (1878).
1S Lawrence, I0 Ky. Op. at 355.
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the statutory amount at the time of the conveyance of the land,
the property passes to the debtor's transferee exempt from pay-
ment of the debtor's debts. 5 6 If this were not the rule, the deed
could be set aside in the grantor's lifetime. Setting aside the
deed would leave the title in the debtor. As the homestead was
exempt from the debts of the debtor before the conveyance, it
would continue to be exempt when the transaction was set aside.
The result is different, however, when a surviving spouse
attempts to convey property held pursuant to the probate home-
stead exemption. The probate homestead merely confers on the
surviving spouse a right of occupancy for as long as the surviving
spouse lives on the homesteadA57 It does not give the surviving
spouse a vendible life estate in the homestead, but only an estate
dependent upon the surviving spouse's continued occupancy 151
An attempt by the surviving spouse to sell this right of occupancy
constitutes an abandonment and irrevocable loss of the nght. 159
The transferee acquires no right to occupy the property because
the very attempt to execute the sale of the probate homestead
right extinguishes the surviving spouse's right of occupancy.' 60
The decedent's heirs at law become entitled to immediate pos-
session of the property 161
While the surviving spouse's transferee takes nothing under
the attempted conveyance of the probate homestead right, the
transferee does become an adverse holder of the property vis a
vis the decedent's heirs from the time the transferee takes actual
possession or possession through a tenant. 62 Therefore, the stat-
256 First Natl Bank of Jackson, 150 S.W.2d at 896.
, KRS § 427.070(1).
' Clay's Guardian v. Wallace, 76 S.W 388 (Ky. 1903).
119 Hager v. Vincent, 15 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Ky. 1929); Tobien v. Gentry, 208 S.W
325, 326 (Ky. 1919); Shepard v. Browning, 160 S.W 950, 951 (Ky. 1913); Phillips v.
Williams, 113 S.W 908, 911 (Ky. 1908), rev'd on other grounds, Consolidation Coal
Co. v. Grayson, 216 S.W 848, 850 (Ky. 1919); Freeman v. Mills, 39 S.W 826, 827
(Ky. 1897). Contra Howard, 105 S.W.2d at 132 (when surviving spouse transferred deed
to a family member and continued to use and occupy the land, homestead was not
abandoned).
260 Hager, 15 S.W.2d at 427; Shepard, 160 S.W at 951; Freeman, 39 S.W at 827.
161 Sams, 225 S.W.2d at 629.
262 Id. (transferee took possession through a tenant); see Burchett v. James, 246
S.W.2d 461 (Ky. 1952) (transferee took actual possession); Combs v. Ezell, 24 S.W.2d
301 (Ky. 1930) (transferee took actual possession); Settle v. Simpson, 264 S.W 1092
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ute of limitations for the transferee to acquire title by adverse
possession begins to run against the decedent's heirs from the
date the surviving spouse's transferee took possession of the
homestead under the invalid conveyance. 163 Even if some of the
heirs of the decedent are infants, the statute of limitations begins
to run against all the heirs from the date the surviving spouse's
transferee takes possession as long as some of the heirs are then
suz juris. 164
Because the character of the probate homestead, a mere right
of occupancy in the surviving spouse and infant children, pre-
cludes its transfer to an assignee of the surviving spouse, the
surviving spouse cannot enforce a note and mortgage given by
the transferee to secure payment of the price. The transferee
receives nothing by virtue of the attempted sale. Thus, no con-
sideration exists for the transferee's note and mortgage. 165 How-
ever, the transferee's promise to pay may become enforceable
when the transferee actually benefits from the forfeiture of the
probate homestead because the transferee is the owner of the
land subject to the surviving spouse's homestead rights, and the
surviving spouse's attempted transfer frees the land from the
probate homestead claim by working an automatic forfeiture.
In Overby v. Williams,'6 the surviving spouse entered into
a contract to sell her probate homestead to her son-in-law. The
widow took a note from the son-in-law and a mortgage from
both the son-m-law and the decedent's daughter to secure the
payment of the price. When the widow later attempted to enforce
the note and mortgage, the son-in-law and daughter argued that
because the widow's homestead interest could not be conveyed,
they had received no consideration in exchange for their promise
to pay. The court found the consideration necessary to support
the note and mortgage m the forfeiture of the widow's home-
stead.
(Ky. 1924) (transferee took actual possession); Campbell v. Whisman, 209 S.W 27 (Ky.
1919) (transferee took actual possession).
-- Burchett, 246 S.W.2d at 463-64; Combs, 24 S.W.2d at 305; Settle, 264 S.W at
1092.
1, Settle, 264 S.W at 1094.
' See, e.g., Overby, 185 S.W at 823.
'" 185 S.W 822 (Ky. 1916).
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When an heir or owner of the fee subject to the surviving
spouse's probate homestead produces a forfeiture of the probate
homestead by entering into a transaction to purchase it from the
surviving spouse, the land is relieved of the homestead encum-
brances just as if the transfer of the widow's homestead rights
had been a valid conveyance. The heir acquires the immediate
right to possess the land. This right is valuable and furishes
sufficient consideration for the heir's promise to pay the pur-
chase price. In Overby, the son-in-law was not the decedent's
heir, but he was married to the sole heir. 167 The court will not
always find that the attempted purchase of the surviving spouse's
probate homestead by the spouse of the heir makes the heir
liable for the purchase price. However, the court viewed this
transaction as though the heir had made the purchase because
the court found that the daughter instigated the attempted pur-
chase of the widow's probate homestead rights and the daughter
directly benefited from the forfeiture.
Not every attempt to convey the surviving spouse's home-
stead exemption works a forfeiture of the probate homestead.
For example, merely offering the land for sale does not cause a
forfeiture. 68 Similarly, a conditional sale of the homestead prop-
erty does not necessarily work a forfeiture of the surviving
spouse's probate homestead. In Moore v Moore,69 the widow
purported to convey the land which constituted her probate
homestead to a third party The decedent's creditors sought to
reach the land using the theory that the conveyance had trans-
ferred no interest to the transferee, but instead it had worked a
forfeiture of the widow's homestead rights. The court did not
find a forfeiture of the probate homestead because parol evi-
dence established that the deed had been made pursuant to the
condition that the widow would sell the land to the transferee
only if she had the right to sell the land. In Persifull v Hind,70
the surviving spouse was permitted to claim a probate homestead
in land the decedent died owning subject to a contract of sale
when the purchaser thereafter abandoned the contract.
167 Id. at 822.
Gregory v. Oates, 18 S.W 231, 232 (Ky. 1892).
78 S.W 141 (Ky. 1904).
11 S.W 15 (Ky. 1889).
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I. Forfeiture of the Homestead Exemption-By Abandonment
Both the lntervivos and probate homesteads are lost if the
claimant abandons the homestead property 171 In fact, abandon-
ment is the only method by which the intervivos homestead can
be lost. 72 Unlike the probate homestead, if an intervivos home-
stead is lost because the claimant abandoned the property, the
claimant can later reclaim the intervivos homestead by resuming
occupancy of the homestead. 73 Once a probate homestead has
been abandoned, however, an adult claimant cannot thereafter
repossess the property under the protection of the probate home-
stead exemption. 174
Although a debtor and the debtor's adult surviving spouse
can abandon their respective homestead exemptions by ceasing
to occupy the property, a minor cannot so lose its probate
homestead. 175 A minor child's right to claim a probate homestead
in the decedent's property is not defeated because the child did
not occupy the homestead with the decedent at the time of the
decedent's death.' 76 Even if the minor child does not occupy the
property after the decedent's death, but instead the child's guard-
ian rents out the property for the benefit of the child, the
property is still protected as the child's probate homestead from
claims of the decedent's creditors. 177 Abandonment of the pro-
bate homestead by the decedent's surviving spouse does not
affect the infant children's rights to enjoy a probate homestead
in the property until the youngest child reaches the age of
majority 178
An infant surviving spouse is similarly protected from loss
from abandonment of the probate homestead. By ceasing to
occupy the homestead property, a minor surviving spouse does
,71 See e.g., Foreman, 127 S.W.2d at 858 (abandonment of intervivos homestead);
Tinsley, 235 S.W at 731 (abandonment of probate homestead).
17 Brewer, 105 S.W.2d at 584.
7 Id.
174 Phillips, 113 S.W at 911.
M7 Baker v. Lane, 118 S.W 963, 965 (Ky. 1909).
176 Potter, 96 S.W at 530.
17 Id.
"I Phipps v. Acton, 75 Ky. 375, 377 (1876); KRS § 427.070(1).
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not forfeit the right to assert the probate homestead upon arriv-
ing of age. 179
A voluntary relinquishment of a claimant's right to occupy
the property free from creditors' claims constitutes an abandon-
ment of either an intervivos or probate homestead. Whether a
homestead has been abandoned is a question of fact determined
by the specific circumstances of each case. The homestead claim-
ant is not required to live on the land continuously to preserve
the homestead exemption. 180 The crucial issue is whether the
claimant's cessation of occupancy is temporary and accompamed
by the claimant's intention to return and to occupy the prop-
erty.181
No hard and fast rule exists as to the amount or character
of the evidence sufficient to establish the fact of abandonment.182
The claimant's intention to abandon the homestead can be es-
tablished by parol evidence"3 of the claimant's actions and the
circumstances accompanying the claimant's absence from the
homestead 4 as well as by statements made by the claimant.'85
Neither the surviving spouse's absence from the homestead
property'8 6 nor the surviving spouse's holding of the homestead
property through a tenant'8 7 constitutes an abandonment if the
surviving spouse intends to return and to occupy the property
at some future time. 8
The length of the surviving spouse's physical absence from
the property does not deternune whether the absence is "tem-
porary" or "permanent." An absence of any duration may
constitute an abandonment because abandonment occurs at the
moment the claimant intends to remain away permanently Thus,
in Hamer v McCown, 8 9 a surviving spouse absent from the
-' Love v, McCandless, 163 S.W 197, 198 (Ky. 1914).
Hamer v. McCown, 21 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Ky. 1929).
Foreman, 127 S.W.2d at 858.
2 Burch v. Atcluson, 6 Ky. L. Rptr. 636, 637-38 (1885).
"' Love, 163 S.W. at 199.
'"Foreman, 127 S.W.2d at 858.
M See Burch, 6 Ky. L. Rptr. at 637.
I" Evans v. Evans' Adm'r, 76 Ky. 587, 588 (1878); Phipps, 75 Ky. at 375.
11 Hamer, 21 S.W.2d at 834; Lancaster v. Redding, 26 S.W 1013 (Ky. 1894).
Brewer, 105 S.W.2d at 584; Hamer, 21 S.W.2d at 834.
'"21 S.W.2d 833 (Ky. 1929).
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homestead for seventeen years was still protected by the probate
homestead because the surviving spouse always intended to re-
turn. In Boggess v Johnston,190 on the other hand, when the
decedent's widow remarried and moved to her new husband's
house, the court treated her absence of just seven months from
the decedent's home as an abandonment of the probate home-
stead in the decedent's property. The Boggess court reasoned
that when a widow takes up residence with her new husband on
land that he owns, the new home is presumptively the widow's
permanent home.
If phrased in a less sexist manner, the presumption is sup-
portable. Absent a showing of contrary intention, the law may
presume reasonably that the home two spouses share is the
permanent home of both spouses. Thus, the Boggess court's
finding that the widow abandoned the probate homestead rested
neither on the length of her absence from the homestead nor on
her gender, but on the lack of evidence that she left her first
husband's property with an intention to return to it later. Her
actual return to the property seven months after she remarried
and moved to her new husband's home was not the fulfillment
of some ever-present and fixed intention to return. It was
prompted by her desire to defeat a law suit that her children
filed for partition of the decedent's property.
Remarriage of the surviving spouse alone does not constitute
an abandonment of the spouse's probate homestead. In Brewer
v. Brewer,191 a widow who remarried and moved off the home-
stead land was permitted to assert the probate homestead ex-
emption to shield the property from the decedent's creditor. The
evidence established that the widow had the requisite intention
to return to the homestead property. She relinquished her oc-
cupancy because the property needed repairs. She left furniture
in the dwelling house, and she informed her tenants that she
intended to move back to the premises as soon as she could.
She also voted in the district where the homestead property was
located, and her infant child attended school in that district. In
Taree v. Spriggs,192 a widow who remarried was permitted to
165 S.W 413 (Ky. 1914).
105 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1937).
" 147 S.W 754 (Ky. 1912).
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continue to enjoy her probate homestead in her first husband's
property even though she was frequently absent from the prop-
erty for significant periods of time. Her second husband travelled
extensively and she often went to stay with him. However, she
always left most of her furniture and other personal effects in
the house as well as someone in charge of the property as her
tenant. Upon each departure, she also verbalized her intention
to return.
As determination of abandonment depends upon the home-
stead claimant's intention, no particular act can be identified as
an abandonment. The above cases establish that remarriage is
not in itself an act of abandonment of the probate homestead
in the first spouse's property Remarriage coupled with the per-
manent relocation to the second spouse's home will be charac-
terized as an abandonment. 93 Holding the property through a
tenant is not an abandonment if the surviving spouse intends to
return. 194 However, holding through a tenant will not preserve
the probate homestead if the surviving spouse intended to leave
the land permanently 195 Merely moving out of state is not suf-
ficient to cause a forfeiture of the probate homestead, but mov-
ing out of state with the intention of making a permanent home
somewhere else does work a forfeiture.'9
The voluntariness of the surviving spouse's absence from the
property also affects the court's determination of whether the
surviving spouse intended a permanent move. For example, a
surviving spouse who is forced by another to leave the property
has not abandoned it.197 Similarly, a surrender of occupancy
under duress and ignorance of the claimant's homestead rights
is not an abandonment. 198 Even the cessation of occupancy be-
cause of confinement in a mental institution does not constitute
an abandonment because the absence is not voluntary 199
193 Nelson v. Nelson, 96 S.W 794, 796 (Ky. 1906).
Hamer, 21 S.W.2d at 834; Lancaster, 26 S.W at 1014.
"9 Bloch, 91 S.W at 276.
9 See Tinsley, 235 S.W at 731.
See Taree, 147 S.W at 755-56.
'9' Young v. Milward, 58 S.W 592 (Ky. 1900).
' National Loan & Bldg. Ass'n No. 1 of Newport, 60 S.W at 13.
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The decision of Kentucky's highest court in Burch v
Atchisonm indicates that equitable considerations can affect the
court's determination of whether the homestead claimant's pres-
ent intention upon leaving the property was to remain away
permanently In Burch, the homestead claimant had an intervi-
vos homestead in a farm. After living on the farm for two years,
the claimant rented out the land by the year, moved to a city
six miles away, and rented a home. The claimant did not return
to the farm until five years later. During the interim, the claim-
ant contracted some debts. The creditor obtained judgments,
executions issued, and the farm was sold. The claimant brought
suit to set aside the execution sale upon the ground that the
farm was protected under the intervivos homestead exemption.
In support of its decision that the claimant had abandoned
the homestead upon moving to the city, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals indicated that a court should be more inclined to find
that on leaving the claimant intended to remain away perma-
nently if rights of others intervene during the claimant's absence.
For example, a notorious act of leaving such as that which
occurred in Burch justifiably may give rise to a presumption
that subsequent creditors extended credit upon the belief that
property formerly occupied as an intervivos homestead was now
available to satisfy any indebtedness of the claimant. The same
presumption would not be supportable where the debts were
created when the debtor personally occupied the property
J. Miscellaneous Matters Affecting the Homestead Exemption
If a surviving spouse acquires a probate homestead in the
deceased spouse's property, the probate homestead is not de-
stroyed if the surviving spouse later acquires a fee interest in the
same property For example, in Evansville Coffin Co. v $um-
ner,2°1 the decedent died survived by a spouse and two infant
children. The surviving spouse elected to take the probate home-
stead in the land that the spouses and children had occupied as
a home. Each child inherited an Vndivided one-half interest in
the fee subject to the surviving spouse's probate homestead
- 6 Ky. L. Rptr. 636 (1$85).
- 226 S,W 363 (Ky. 1920).
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right.202 Thereafter, both children died and the surviving spouse
inherited the children's fee interests in the land. As the surviving
spouse's probate homestead was a mere right of occupancy and
not an estate in land, the court held that the probate homestead
did not merge into the fee the survivor inherited from the
children. Because the survivor had a probate homestead in the
land, the deceased spouse's creditors could not force a sale of
the land. The fee interest the survivor inherited from the children
was protected by the intervivos homestead from the survivor's
own creditors.
In Morgan v Wooton,2 3 a grandparent gave land to his
adult child. The child died intestate survived by a spouse and a
minor child. The surviving spouse elected to take a probate
homestead in the land instead of a dower share. Thus, the infant
child inherited the land subject to the probate homestead. There-
after, the infant child died. Pursuant to Kentucky's ancestral
property statute,204 the land passed back to the grandparent.
However, it passed to the grandparent subject to the surviving
spouse's right to continue to occupy the land under the probate
homestead exemption.
A surviving spouse is barred from claiming a probate home-
stead if the. survivor voluntarily left the decedent and lived in
adultery without having become reconciled before the decedent
died. 205 Similarly, a spouse convicted of bigamy is barred from
claiming a probate homestead.206 An absolute divorce bars the
surviving ex-spouse from asserting any claim, including a claim
for a probate homestead, in the estate of the other ex-spouse.?
A divorce from bed and board, however, does not operate as a
bar to a surviving spouse's claim of a probate homestead. 28
Similarly, the right to claim a probate homestead in the deceased
spouse's estate is not lost merely because the spouses were not
living together when the decedent died. 209 By statute, if the
- KRS § 391.010(l) (1984).
23 224 S.W 665 (Ky. 1920).
' KRS § 391.020(2).
- Id. at § 392.090(2).
Id. at § 392.100.
20 Id. at § 392.090(I); see Skinner v. Walker, 34 S.W 233, 235 (Ky. 1896).
2 KRS § 403.050 (1984).
Redmond's Adm'x, 66 S.W at 747.
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surviving spouse took the life of the decedent and was convicted
of the felony, that spouse forfeits all interest in and to the
decedent's property.210 The statutory forfeiture provision for
murder would also bar an infant child convicted of feloniously
killing its parent from claimng a probate homestead in the
deceased parent's property. Finally, the surviving spouse is not
entitled to claim a probate homestead in the decedent's land if
the survivor elects to take dower 211 or elects to take under the
decedent's will.212
K. Relationship of Probate Homestead to Dower and Other
Rights of the Surviving Spouse
If the decedent dies intestate, $7,500 worth of personalty is
exempted from distribution for the benefit of the surviving
spouse2 3 in addition to any other rights the survivor might have
in the decedent's estate. 214 However, the surviving spouse must
elect between homestead and dower 215 within a reasonable time
period after the decedent's death. 216 Until the surviving spouse
is assigned either dower or homestead, the survivor is entitled
to quarantine. 21 7
The surviving spouse's election of either dower or the probate
homestead in the decedent's land binds the surviving spouse. 218
210 KRS § 381.280 (1984).
211 Sams, 255 S.W.2d at 629 (husband must elect between dower and homestead);
Berger v. Berger, 94 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Ky. 1936) (wife must elect between dower and
homestead).
2 Jarboe v. Hayden, 117 S.W 961, 962 (Ky. 1909) (husband taking under wife's
will cannot claim a probate homestead in the land); Oschsver v. German Bldg. & Sav.
Ass'n, 12 Ky. Op. 217 (1883) (wife taking under husband's will cannot claim a probate
homestead in the land).
213 KRS § 391.030(1)(c).
214 Blades v. Blades' Adm'r, 159 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Ky. 1942)(amount exempted
from distribution does not become part of the decedent's estate but instead vests in the
surviving spouse).
MI Widow must elect between homestead and dower. Berger, 94 S.W.2d at 620;
Thompson, 105 S.W at 1187; Redmond's Adm'x, 66 S.W at 747; Freeman, 59 S.W
at 4; Funk v. Walters, 12 Ky. Op. 761, 763 (1884). Widower must elect between
homestead and dower. Sams, 255 S.W.2d at 629; Carpenter v. Hazelngg, 45 S.W 666,
667 (Ky. 1898).
"I In re Gibson, 33 F. Supp. at 840; White v. Holder, 118 S.W 995, 996 (Ky.
1909).
217 KRS § 392.050.
2M James v. Reeves, 215 S.W 66, 67 (Ky. 1919).
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For example, if the surviving spouse elects to take the probate
homestead in lieu of the dower share and thereafter abandons
the homestead or attempts to sell it, the survivor's rights to a
probate homestead in the land end and the survivor cannot have
a dower interest in the land.219
The surviving spouse's decision to elect the probate home-
stead instead of dower does not bar the spouse from claiming a
share as an intestate taker under KRS section 391.010 if the
decedent is not survived by children, descendants of children,
parents, siblings, or the descendants of siblings. In Eustache
v Rodaquest,' 1 under the statutes then in effect, a nonresident
alien was entitled to inherit only a very limited interest in the
decedent's real estate and was not entitled to inherit any of the
decedent's personalty The decedent was survived by only a
spouse and a nonresident, alien sibling. The surviving spouse,
as the decedent's only distributee, took all the personalty as well
as a probate homestead m the land the decedent's sibling inher-
ited.
Prior to 1894, the dower or curtesy share available to the
surviving spouse was only a life interest in the decedent's real
property The widow's dower share was a life estate in one-third
of the decedent's surplus real property2 and the widower's
curtesy share, if a child had been born alive during the marriage,
was a life estate in all of the decedent's surplus real propertym
Thus, any election between dower and the probate homestead
did not involve the relinquishment of a claim to a share in the
decedent's personalty Under a separate statute,22 the husband
was given all of the wife's surplus personalty if he survived her.
A surviving wife received one-third of the husband's surplus
personalty when children also survived the decedent and one-
half of the husband's surplus personalty if no children sur-
vived.22-
219 Phillips, 113 S.W at 911; Kimberlin v. Isaacs, 62 S.W 494, 495 (Ky. 1901).
Hogan v. Hogan, 44 S.W 953, 954 (Ky. 1898); Eustache, 74 Ky. at 46.
=l 74 Ky. 42 (1874).
2n Ky. Gen. Stat. ch. 52, Art. 4, § 2 (1888).
- Id. at § 1.
- Id. at ch. 31, § 11 (1888).
-' Id.
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The Weisinger Act, passed in 1894,22 redefined the surviving
spouses' inheritance rights. Regardless of gender, the surviving
spouse's dower became a life estate in one-third of the decedent's
surplus real propertym7 and one-half of the decedent's surplus
personalty in fee.
Because the dower share since 1894 has included both real
and personal property, the question arises whether the election
of the probate homestead under the contemporary dower/curtesy
statute bars the surviving spouse from the dower share in the
decedent's personalty as well as in the decedent's realty In Miller
v Keown,' decided after personalty was included in the statu-
tory definition of dower, the surviving spouse was awarded the
personalty exemption provided for in Kentucky General Statutes
section 1403(5)29 and one-half of the surplus personalty 230 In
addition to these amounts, the court said that the survivor was
entitled to the use of the house and lot as a homestead as long
as the survivor occupied it. Thus, the survivor's election of the
probate homestead did not preclude the surviving spouse from
receiving the dower share of the decedent's personalty.
The surviving spouse must also elect between the probate
homestead and any gift left to the survivor under the testator's
will.21 Consequently, if the surviving spouse elects to take under
the testator's will the same land that the probate homestead
protected, the surviving spouse takes the property subject to the
claims of the decedent's creditors.232
Today, the probate homestead is still merely a right of
occupancy for the surviving spouse's life. This right may be lost
by abandonment or an attempted alienation of the interest.23
The realty share of contemporary dower/curtesy is a vested fee
26 Id. at ch. 66, Art. 3, § 2132 (1894).
=7 Today, the surviving spouse's dower/curtesy share in realty is a fee interest in
one-half of the decedent's surplus real property. KRS § 392.020.
- 195 S.W 430, 433-34 (Ky. 1917).
2" Ky. Gen. Stat. ch. 39, § 1403(5) (1894).
Id. at ch. 66, Art. 3, § 2137.
23 Jarboe, 117 S.W at 962; Oschsver, 12 Ky. Op. at 218.
212 McLean v. Trabue, 135 S.W 309, 310 (Ky. 1911), overruling Nichols v. Lan-
caster, 32 S.W 676 (Ky. 1895); Myers' Guardian v. Myers' Adm'r, 12 S.W 933, 934
(Ky. 1890); KRS § 396.060(1) (1984).
-3 Berger, 94 S.W.2d at 620.
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interest in one-half of the decedent's surplus realty134 and a life
estate in one-third of any real property transferred away during
marriage without the release of dower. Surviving spouses may
dispose of their dower share as they see fit.235
The value of the probate homestead may not exceed $5,000,236
but no dollar limit exists on the value of the.survivor's dower
interest of one-half of the decedent's surplus realty 237 The pro-
bate homestead is assigned to the.surviving spouse before the
decedent's creditors are satisfied. 238 The dower share is taken
from the decedent's surplus realty after the debts, the costs of
admimstration, and the funeral expenses have been paid.239 Con-
sequently, unless the estate is loaded with debts or is very small,
electing dower will be more beneficial to the surviving spouse
than electing the probate homestead.
If the surviving spouse does elect to take the probate home-
stead in the decedent's land, the spouse nevertheless must pay
the property taxes on the land.m° If the surviving spouse does
not pay the property taxes, a subsequent tax sale will not deprive
the intestate takers who inherited the land subject to the survi-
vor's probate homestead of their remainder interest in the land
if they had no notice of the tax sale. 1 The purchaser at the sale
merely has a lien against the land for the amount paid plus
interest. 2
If the surviving spouse holds the land as a probate homestead
and makes improvements, the spouse is not entitled to a lien for
the enhancement of the property as against the intestate takers
who inherited the land subject to the probate homestead.2 3 In
Smith v Richey,24 the defendant made improvements to the
homestead property pursuant to an agreement with the surviving
=4 KRS § 392.020.
Berger, 94 S.W.2d at 620; Phillips, 113 S.W at 911.
"' KRS § 427.060.
237 Id. at § 392.020.
-3 Id. at § 427.060.
-9 Id. at § 392.020.
240 Id. at § 132.220(4) (1982); see Carter, 188 S.W at 380; Hersperger, 16 Ky. L.
Rptr. at 61.
2,1 Carter, 188 S.W at 380; Bradley v. Sears, 127 S.W 782, 783 (Ky. 1910).
-2 Bradley, 127 S.W at 783.
-3 Smith, 215 S.W at 430.
2, Id.
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spouse. The defendant agreed to provide-lifetime care for the
surviving spouse and the surviving spouse agreed to give the
land to the defendant. A probate homestead cannot be trans-
ferred to anyone else. Therefore, the defendant took no interest
in the land under the agreement with the surviving spouse. As
the surviving spouse cannot have a lien against the intestate
takers of the land for the value of any improvements the spouse
made, the defendant could not have any rights against the in-
testate takers for the value of the improvements. 45
When the dower share was only a life interest m the land of
the decedent and the surviving, spouse elected dower, the land
was subject to the claims of the decedent's creditors. However,
the surviving spouse could claim an intervivos homestead in the
dower land to protect it from the surviving spouse's own credi-
tors .2 Certainly, the intervivos homestead is available today to
a surviving spouse who elects dower to protect the survivor's fee
interest in the land from the survivor's creditors. 247
If the surviving spouse fails to elect between dower and the
probate homestead, the cases state that the court must elect the
estate which is most beneficial to the surviving spouse and infant
children. However, in every case involving a nonelecting sur-
viving spouse the courts have decided that the survivor elected
homestead because the value of the decedent's real property was
less than the amount of the homestead. Thus, the election of
the probate- homestead life estate in the decedent's realty was
more beneficial to the surviving spouse than the dower life estate
in one-third of all the decedent's realty Today, the failure to
elect would probably result in a decision that the surviving
spouse took dower rather than the probate homestead because
the dower share of the real property the decedent died owmng
is now a one-half fee interest while the probatehomestead con-
tinues to provide a life estate in the decedent's residence worth
less than $5,000.
u' Id. at 431.
Suter, 58 S.W at 990.
KRS § 427.060.
2,1 Sams, 255 S.W.2d at 629; Burchett, 246 S.W.2d at 463 (widow makes positive
election); Wilson's Adm'r, 156 S.W.2d at 835; Anderson v. Sanders, 236 S.W 561, 561
(Ky. 1922); see Campbell, 209 S.W at 27; Carver v. Elmore, 144 S.W 1062, 1063 (Ky.
1912).
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One Kentucky decision, Consolidation Coal v Grayson,249
may preclude a court from presuming that the spouse elected
dower even if dower is the more beneficial interest. In Consoli-
dation, a surviving spouse who had not been assigned dower or
homestead in the decedent's land leased the land. The court
found that the only occupancy right the surviving spouse had
prior to the assignment of dower or homestead is the privilege
of quarantine as defined in KR8 section 392,050. The privilege
of quarantine is not an assignable interest,
In Consolidation, the purported lessee took no interest in
the land because the transaction invalidly attempted to convey
the nontransferable quarantine interest. If the principle enunci-
ated in Consolidation is good law, the courts must treat a
nonelecting spouse's occupancy of the decedent's residence as
occupancy according to the nontransferable privilege of quar-
antine, Any attempt to convey the survivor's quarantine interest
would be a nullity. The court could choose between dower and
homestead for t nonelecting surviving spouse only in those in-
stances when the court was in the process of admstering the
decedent's estate and the survivor was merely occupying, not
purporting to transfer, the land. The court could then treat the
surviving spouse as having elected the more beneficial interest in
the land and could then assign the survivor that interest. If
dower were assigned, the survivor could thereafter convey that
interest, but if the survivor was assigned the probate homestead,
the survivor would not have a transferable interest.
L. Effect of Spousal Election on Children's Homestead
Exemption
Two statutory provisions employ different language to de-
scribe the permissible claimants of the children's probate home-
stead. KRS section 427.100 states that the debtor's intervivos
homestead exemption continues after the debtor's death for the
benefit of the debtor's surviving spouse and "children." How-
ever, KRS section 427.070(1) says that the probate homestead is
for the surviving spouse and "the unmarried infant children"
-9 216 S.W, 848 (Ky. 1919), overruling Phillips, 113 S.W at 908.
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of the deceased debtor. The cases treat the language modifying
the noun "children" in KRS section 427.070(1) as the controlling
language. Once a child reaches the age of majority or marries,
the child no longer receives a probate homestead in the deceased
parent's property 250
The guardian of the infant children must affirmatively claim
the probate homestead for the children or it will be lost.25 1 The
infant children's right to a probate homestead is also lost if the
decedent transferred the homestead property prior to death. 252
The rights of the decedent's infant children to a probate
homestead are linked to the surviving spouse's election of either
dower or the probate homestead in the decedent's property For
example, if the decedent dies intestate and the surviving spouse
elects to take the probate homestead, the children are entitled
to jointly occupy the homestead with the surviving spouse.253
However, if the surviving spouse elects the probate homestead
and subsequently forfeits or abandons it, the decedent's unmar-
ned minor children do not lose their right to continue to occupy
the homestead.2 4
If the surviving spouse elects to take dower, the decedent's
children cannot have a homestead in the decedent's property 255
However, the court must take the children's homestead rights
into account in allotting dower.2 . 6 The infant children's right to
a homestead attaches to the land set apart as the surviving
spouse's dower. 2 7 The portion set apart for the surviving spouse
and infant children should include the dwelling house if it can
be done without materially injuring the interests of others.25 8 A
subsequent conveyance of the surviving spouse's dower interest
does not defeat the children's homestead rights in the land. The
-o Jones v. Crawford, 84 S.W 568, 569 (Ky. 1905).
21 Howard v. Howard, 150 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Ky. 1941).
232 Hanna's Assignees, 78 S.W at 917.
-3 KRS § 427.070(1).
Id., see Davidson v. Marcum, 89 S.W 703, 704 (Ky. 1905); Phipps, 75 Ky. at
375.
Thompson, 105 S.W at 1187.
In re Gibson, 33 F Supp. at 841; Hanna's Assignees, 78 S.W at 917; KRS §
427.100.
=' Hanna's Assignees, 78 S.W at 917.
Phillips, 116 S.W at 688.
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purchaser of the surviving spouse's dower takes the land subject
to the children's homestead rights.2 9 If the surviving spouse
receives dower in the form of money instead of land because
the property had to be sold, the value of the children's home-
stead is subtracted from the amount due the surviving spouse
and paid to the children's guardian.
If the decedent dies testate devising the homestead to the
surviving spouse who elects to take under the provisions of the
will, the surviving spouse has no claim to a probate homestead
in the property she was devised. 261 The surviving spouse's accep-
tance of a will gift -of the homestead also bars the infant chil-
dren's homestead in the property if the decedent had no
creditors. 262
The part of KRS section 427.070(1) which provides that
termination of the widow's occupancy does not affect the infant
children's right to occupy the homestead does not change this
result. The statutory rule only applies in cases when the surviving
spouse and infant children became entitled to a probate home-
stead in intestacy and the spouse subsequently forfeits or aban-
dons it. The statute does not apply when the surviving spouse
became entitled to the homestead under the terms of the dece-
dent's will. 263 Conversely, if the decedent dies testate devising
the homestead to the surviving spouse who elects to take the will
gift even though the decedent has creditors and renouncing the
will and taking homestead would provide more advantage, the
surviving spouse's election does not impair the infant children's
right to occupy the homestead. 4
II. PERSONALTY EXEMPTION
The common law right of estovers was the widow's right
during her quarantine to take reasonable sustenance from the
2,1 Id. at 688; Phillips v. Williams, 113 S.W 908, 912 (Ky. 1908).
Thompson, 105 S.W at 1188.
2' Best v. Burnam, 11 Ky. Op. 388, 390 (1881).
Demarest v. Allen, 224 S.W 458, 458 (Ky. 1920); Hazelett v. Farthing, 22 S.W
646, 647 (Ky. 1893); Ellmore v. Ellmore's Adm'r, 4 Ky. L. Rptr. 622 (1883), sub nom.
Elmore v. Elmore's Adm'r, 11 Ky. Op. 902 (1883).
-1 Hazelett, 22 S.W at 647.
2 Schnabel v. Schnabel's Ex'x, 56 S.W 983, 987 (Ky. 1900); Myers' Guardian,
12 S.W at 934.
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decedent's property 26 Although a contemporary right of quar-
antine is codified m KRS section 392.050, the surviving spouse
now receives a $7,500 personalty exemption in lieu of the wi-
dow's common law nght of estovers. 26
If the decedent dies intestate, KRS section 391.030(1)(c) ex-
empts personal property or money on hand or in a bank up to
$7,500 from distribution and sale for the surviving spouse, or
for the children if there is no surviving spouse. The district court
having jurisdiction over the decedent's estate may set apart the
$7,500 for the surviving spouse or for the decedent's children if
there is no surviving spouse.
At any time prior to the setting apart of the $7,500, the
surviving spouse may procure an order from the district court
authorizing the withdrawal of up to $1,000 from any bank or
depository account belonging to the decedent's estate.2 7 The
amount withdrawn is charged against the $7,500 that is exempt
from distribution. m The surviving spouse, or, if there is no
surviving spouse, the children, may take the personalty exemp-
tion in tangible personal property as well as in the form of
money 269
A. Claimants
The Kentucky legislature enacted the first personalty exemp-
tioij statute in 1845. 270 The legislature has made changes in both
the identity of those entitled to claim the exemption and the
property exempted from distribution and sale. The law in force
at the decedent's death deternunes who is entitled to the exemp-
tion and what the claimants take. 271
Until 1970, only a widow could claim the personalty exemp-
tion. Today, the exemption benefits the surviving spouse of the
intestate decedent without regard to the survivor's gender. 2 2 The
14 See Wyly v. Kallenbach, 76 S.W,2d 34, 36 (Ky. 1934) (discusses the long history
of quarantine and estovers).
KRS § 391.030(1)(c) (1984).
267 Id. at § 391.030(2).
2U Id.
2 Id. at § 391.030(3).
1844 Ky. Acts 174.
"I Oster's Ex'r v. Ohlnan, 219 S.W 187, 189 (Ky. 1920).
xn 1970 Ky. Acts 222, § 2.
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surviving spouse may take the personalty exemption regardless
of whether the decedent has surviving children.273 Prior to 1974,
the surviving spouse had to share the personalty exemption with
the decedent's surviving children. Since 1974, the exemption is
only available to the decedent's children if no spouse survives
the decedent.274
Although prior to 1982 only the decedent's infant children
were eligible for the exemption, today, if there is no surviving
spouse, any child of the decedent, regardless of age, may claim
the exemption. 275 Because the statute authorizes only one $7,500
exemption, if there is more than one surviving child of the
decedent, the children must share the $7,500 exemption. 276 The
children are not barred from claiming the exemption merely
because the spouse waived her or his right to claim it. 277 The
decedent's adopted children are entitled to claim the exemption
if there is no surviving spouse, 278 but stepchildren are never
permitted to share in the exemption.279 A child convicted of
causing the felomous death of the decedent does not share in
the exemption.20
B. Priority of the Personalty Exemption over Other Claims
For some purposes, the $7,500 personalty exemption is treated
as vesting absolutely in the surviving spouse, or if there is no
surviving spouse, in the decedent's children at the moment of
the decedent's death.Y' Thus, the personalty exemption is supe-
rior to the claims of the decedent's heirs,2 2 general creditors, 2S3
271 Chism v. Chlsm, 2 Ky. Op. 461, 461 (1868).
"' 1974 Ky. Acts 299, § 2.
2' 1982 Ky. Acts 51, § 1.
216 Wilson v. Parson's Adm'r, 50 S.W 684, 684 (Ky. 1899).
2" Brown v. Brown's Adm'r, 80 S.W 470, 471 (Ky. 1904).
's KRS § 199.520(2) (Supp. 1986).
Howland's Adm'r v. Harr, 97 S.W 358, 359 (Ky. 1906).
KRS § 381.280 (1970).
2 Kilburn v. Holliday, 175 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1943); Blades v. Blades' Adm'r, 159
S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1942); O'Hara v. O'Hara's Adm'r, 206 S.W 462, 464 (Ky. 1918),
overruled on other grounds, 159 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Ky. 1942).
m Blades, 159 S.W.2d at 409; Bracken's Heirs v. Bracken, 32 S.W 609, 610 (Ky;
1895).
21, Kilburn, 175 S.W.2d at 518; Bracken's Heirs, 32 S.W at 610.
[VOL. 76
FAmmIy PROTECTION
and the decedent's funeral expenses. The exemption also pre-
vails over a claim by one who paid the decedent's debt as the
surety on the debt.2s5
The exemption, however, does not prevail over the claims of
creditors who have security interests in the insolvent decedent's
personalty 286 For example, in International Harvester Co. v
Dyer's Administrator,2 the decedent died owning equipment in
which certain creditors held security interests. Those creditors
received priority over the surviving spouse's personalty exemp-
tion in the division of the proceeds of the sale of mining equip-
ment. Similarly, a vendor's equitable lien to secure payment of
the purchase price of items of personalty the decedent died
owning is supenor to the surviving spouse's personalty exemp-
tion.28
Any statutory lien which is granted prionty over a security
interest in the decedent debtor's personal property is also supe-
nor to the personalty exemption.2 9 For example, an employee's
lien for wages is created by KRS section 376.150. This lien is
against both real and personal property used in the employer's
business. KRS section 376.160 specifically makes such a lien
superior to the lien of any mortgage or other encumbrance
against the employer's property created before or after the em-
ployee's wages became due. In the International Harvester case,29°
the proceeds of the sale of the insolvent decedent's mining
equipment were used first to satisfy the employees' lien for wages
due to them. The holders of the security interests in the mining
equipment had the second claim on the proceeds of the sale of
the equipment and the surviving spouse's personalty exemption
had third priority.
If a judgment or attachment creditor has levied upon the
decedent's personal property prior to the decedent's death, the
2, Kilburn, 175 S.W,2d at 518; Blades, 159 S.W.2d at 407.
W O'Hara, 206 S.W at 464.
I" Graham v. Graham's Adm'x, 306 S.W.2d 831, 831 (Ky. 1957) (unrecorded
security interest has preference over personalty exemption); International Harvester Co.
v. Dyer's Adm'r, 178 S.W.2d 966, 969 (Ky. 1944) (recorded security interest has pref-
erence over personalty exemption).
178 S.W.2d 966 (Ky. 1944).
2 Collier v. Kant's Adm'r, 15 Ky. L. Rptr. 845, 845 (1894).
-' International Harvester Co., 178 S.W.2d at 969.
no Id. at 968-69.
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surviving spouse's personalty exemption does not have priority
over such creditors' claims in the proceeds of a postmortem sale
of that property.291 However, if at the time of death, the dece-
dent was entitled to claim an intervivos personalty exemption in
the property levied upon by a.judgment or attachment creditor,292
the surviving spouse may assert the decedent's intervivos exemp-
tion claim to shelter that property from the creditor's claims.29 3
Such sheltered property could be used to satisfy the surviving
spouse's personalty exemption.
C. Time for Claiming the Personalty Exemption
Prior to 1968, the exemption statute did not require the
claimant to apply for the exemption. The caselaw interpreting
the pre-1968 statute held that the exempt property vested in-
stantly in the claimant at the decedent's death without it first
being set apart. 294 The admimstrator had an affirmative duty to
set apart the exempt property and incurred liability for failing
to do so. 295 Since 1968, the surviving spouse, or if there is no
surviving spouse, the decedent's children, must apply to the court
having jurisdiction over the decedent's estate to have the $7,500
personalty exemption set apart. 29
Before the court sets apart the exempt property or money,
the claimant may petition the court for an order authorizing the
"I Blake v. Durrell, 45 S.W 883, 883 (Ky. 1898).
29 E.g., KRS § 427.010 (Supp. 1986) (an individual debtor's exempt personal
property such as household furnishings, jewelry, personal clothing and ornaments not
to exceed $3,000 in value); id. at § 427.030 (Supp. 1986) (tools not exceeding $300 used
in debtor's trade, one motor vehicle not exceeding $2,500 of debtor who is a mechanic);
id. at § 427.040 (Supp. 1986) (professional library, office equipment, instruments and
furnishings necessary for practice of minister, attorney, physician, surgeon, chiropractor,
veterinarian, or dentist not to exceed $1,000 and one motor vehicle not exceeding $2,500
in value).
20 Myers's Adm'r v. Forsythe, 73 Ky. 394, 399 (1874).
2- Thompson v. Thompson, 78 S.W 418, 419 (Ky. 1904); Mallory's Adm'r v.
Mallory's Adm'r, 17 S.W 737, 738 (Ky. 1891). Contra Williams' Adm'r v. Cambest, 10
Ky. Op. 553, 554 (1880) (title to personalty vests in administrator upon qualification,
and exempt property does not vest in surviving spouse and/or infants until administrator
sets it apart).
19 Blades, 159 S.W.2d at 409; Thompson, 78 S.W at 419; Mallory's Adm'r, 17
S.W at 737.
1968 Ky. Acts 144, § 1.
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claimant to withdraw up to $1,000 from any bank or other
depository holding an account of the decedent. 297 Upon presen-
tation of the order, the bank or depository must permit the
claimant to withdraw the sum and must lodge the order, record-
ing on the order the amount withdrawn, with the circuit clerk.
The clerk must retain the order in the clerk's files for consid-
eration in connection with further proceedings in the estate. The
withdrawal is charged against the $7,500 of property of the estate
exempted from distribution. Under the pre-1968 exemption stat-
ute, a technical error occurred if the court granted the order for
withdrawal of money from a bank or depository account of the
decedent unless the order was applied for prior to the appoint-
ment of the adnuistrator of the decedent's estate.28 The current
statutory language permits the surviving spouse to apply for
such an order any time before the court sets apart the $7,500 in
property or money.29
The claimant must apply for the $7,500 personalty exemption
before the final settlement of the decedent's estate. However, an
inadvertent failure to apply for the exemption in an interun
settlement of the estate does not bar the claim. In Rau v.
Rowe, °° the widow was the administrator of the decedent's
estate. Through the inadvertence of the widow and her attorney
in the preparation of the pleadings for the settlement of her
husband's estate, her claim for the personalty exemption was
omitted. Property was distributed according to the proposed
settlement, but litigation postponed the final settlement of the
estate for many years. During the interim, the wife-adnminstrator
collected rents on real estate which belonged to the decedent's
estate. Upon the final settlement of the estate, the widow claimed
her personalty exemption m the rent proceeds., The court granted
her claim as a matter of common justice and right.
D. Allotment of the Personalty Exemption
KRS section 391.030(1)(c) expressly provides that the $7,500
exemption is taken out of the decedent's personal property. The
KRS § 391.030(2).
See Muffins v. Mulins, 212 S.W.2d 272 (Ky. 1948).
K RIS § 391.030(2).
'o 222 S.W 1070, 1070 (Ky. 1920).
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statute defines personal property as including money on hand
or in a bank or other depository The meaning of personal
property is broader than money, however. Personal property
includes tangible, movable property as well as intangible rights
such as bank deposits, shares of stock and choses in action.
301
The surviving spouse, or the children if there is no surviving
spouse, may select from the personal property of the estate to
the extent that the value of the property selected does not exceed
the statutory amount of $7,500.302
Caselaw in Kentucky recognizes that the personalty exemp-
tion can be taken out of insurance money payable to the dece-
dent's estate, 303 but it cannot come out of the proceeds of an
insurance policy on the decedent's life payable directly to a third
party 304 Similarly, accumulated disability benefits due to the
decedent at the time of death were a proper source for the
payment of the personalty exemption in Canada v Canada's
Administratix.3 5
In Manns v Manns,3°6 a debt owed to the decedent became
the source for the surviving spouse's personalty exemption. Even
if the surviving spouse will take the personalty exemption out
of a debt owed to the decedent, the decedent's administrator,
not the surviving spouse, is the proper party to maintain the
action to collect the debt.307 In Thompson v Thompson,3° a
judgment the decedent had against another was the only signif-
icant asset of the decedent's estate that could fund the personalty
exemption. The administrator attempted to collect the judgment
on behalf of the decedent's estate. The judgment debtor tried to
offset the decedent's debt which the judgment debtor had pur-
chased against the amount owed to the decedent's estate. The
Thompson court did not permit the setoff and avoided giving
30, R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IX (3d ed. 1975).
KRS § 391,030(3).
Frye's Adm'r v. Frye's Adm'x, 80 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Ky. 1935); First Nat'l Bank
of Horse Cave v. Cann's Ex'x, 57 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Ky. 1932).
Thacker v. Cook, 32 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Ky. 1930).
32 S.W.2d 330 (Ky. 1930).
115 S.W 715 (Ky. 1909).
Burge v. Burge's Adm'r, 76 S.W 873, 874 (Ky. 1903).
10, 78 S.W, 418 (Ky. 1904).
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the decedent's debt priority over the surviving spouse's statutory
personalty exemption claim.
Personal property that the decedent dies holding title to as
a trustee is not a proper fund from which to pay the trustee's
surviving spouse the personalty exemption. The beneficiaries of
the trust, not the trustee, own the trust property 309 If the district
court does set aside the surviving spouse's exemption out of
personalty subsequently classified as trust fund property, the
district court order does not bind those claiming to be benefi-
ciaries of the trust in an action in circuit court.3 1 0 Because the
claimants are not parties in the district court proceeding to set
aside the surviving spouse's exempt property, they cannot be
bound by the proceeding.31'
On the death of a partner, the decedent's right in specific
partnership property vests in the surviving partners.3 12 Therefore,
the partnership property cannot be used as the fund for the
payment of the personalty exemption to the deceased partner's
surviving spouse. When the last surviving partner dies, the part-
nership property vests in that partner's legal representative.
However, the surviving spouse of the last partner to die cannot
receive partnership property to fund the personalty exemption
because that property can only be used for partnership pur-
poses. 313
If the decedent dies partially testate leaving property to the
surviving spouse under a will, the surviving spouse may still take
the personalty exemption in any of the decedent's intestate per-
sonalty.314 Absent fraud, the surviving spouse cannot assert the
exemption in personalty the decedent gratuitously transferred
during her or his lifetime. 315 In the allotment of the personalty
exemption, the surviving spouse cannot be charged with the value
of personalty that the decedent transferred to the survivor during
30 Bolmer v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 11 F Supp. 560, 564 (W.D. Ky.
1935); VanDyke v. VanDyke, 2 S.W.2d 1057, 1059 (Ky. 1928).
310 Lawson v. Buhl, 273 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1954).
311 Id.
312 KRS § 362.270(2)(d) (1987).
313 Id.
3,, Weddington v. Adkins, 54 S.W.2d 331, 332-33 (Ky. 1932).
3,, Burge, 76 S.W at 874 (when decedent made valid intervivos transfer, the
property was not part of the estate unless fraud averred).
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the decedent's lifetime.316 If the surviving spouse mistakenly
agrees to allow the administrator to charge an intervivos transfer
against the personalty exemption and the entire estate is distrib-
uted according to that agreement, the surviving spouse may
recover the personalty exemption from the intestate takers. 317
As KRS section 391.030(l)(c) expressly identifies the dece-
dent's personal property as the source of the personalty exemp-
tion, the administrator cannot use the decedent's real estate to
pay the exemption.318 However, if the decedent's personalty was
improperly consumed to pay the decedent's debts or funeral
expenses, the surviving spouse may look to the real estate for
reimbursement of the amount exempted under the statute.319
Similarly, the administrator may use the decedent's real estate
to pay the personalty exemption if the decedent's heirs improp-
erly used the personalty instead of allotting it to the surviving
spouse.3 02
In Nesbit v Wood,321 the sheriff levied upon the decedent's
tobacco (personal property) for nonpayment of taxes on the
decedent's real property. To save the personalty, the widow paid
the taxes. The tobacco was then allotted to the surviving spouse
as her personalty exemption. The Nesbit court held that the
proceeds of the sale of this mortgaged land should be used to
reimburse the surviving spouse for the taxes she had to pay to
save the decedent's personalty
E. Waiver, Relinquishment, and Forfeiture of the Personalty
Exemption
Spouses may voluntarily waive their rights to claim the stat-
utory personalty exemption by entering into an antenuptial 32 or
postnuptial323 contract waiving such rights. The contract must
316 Grayot's Adm'rs v. Vick, 13 Ky. L. Rptr. 175, 176 (1891).
317 Id.
311 Kilburn, 175 S.W.2d at 518.
3,9 Id., Fitzpatrick's Adm'r v. Fitzpatrick, 155 S.W.2d 463, 464 (Ky. 1941) (only
reasonable reimbursement allowed). Contra Oster's Ex'r, 219 S.W at 189 (when widow
could not collect from decedent's real estate, executor became personally liable).
311 Meyers' Adm'r v. Meyers, 50 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Ky. 1932).
32- 56 S.W 714 (Ky. 1900).
322 Brown, 80 S.W at 470.
313 Johnson's Adm'r v. Johnson, 22 S.W.2d 124 (Ky. 1929).
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satisfy the general requirements for antenuptial or postnuptial
agreements. 37 For example, an oral antenuptial agreement waiv-
ing the personalty exemption is ineffective because antenuptial
agreements must be in writing. 32 Similarly, the waiving spouse
must receive consideration for the waiver, or the contract be-
comes unenforceable. 32 Spouses also may relinquish their stat-
utory personalty exemption in a validly executed separation
agreement. 327
The antenuptial, postnuptial or separation agreement must
demonstrate clearly the intention to waive or relinquish the
personalty exemption, but particular words are not necessary
In Johnson's Administrator v Johnson,32 the wife entered into
a postnuptial contract in which she specifically relinquished all
her interest in her husband's real property, including dower and
homestead, as well as any interest she might have in us personal
estate. Despite the lack of explicit language releasing any claim
to the personalty exemption, the court concluded that a valid
postnuptial contractual relinquishment of the exemption had
occurred. In King v. King,329 a separation agreement provided
that the wife and husband waived all rights to dower and home-
stead in each other's real estate and in their distributable share
in each other's personalty " 'so that each shall have the same
control of their property as though they were single and unmar-
ried.' "330 This provision also constituted a valid relinquishment
of the surviving spouse's claim to the personalty exemption.
Similarly, a contract that the surviving spouse and heirs made
after the decedent's death can operate as a complete satisfaction
of all the claims, including.any personalty exemption claim that
the surviving spouse mght make against the decedent's estate. 33'
However, adequate consideration must support the settlement
M See L. GRAHAm & J. KELLER, KENT CKY Domsic RmLAIOmNS LAw (to be
published 1988).
3,, Mallory's Adm'r, 17 S.W at 737.
31 See Johnson's Adm'r, 22 S.W.2d at 125.
12 King v. King, 274 S.W.2d 656 (Ky. 1954).
3- 22 S.W.2d 124 (Ky. 1929).
3- 274 S.W.2d 656 (Ky. 1954).
3" Id. at 657.
M Teater v. Teater, 299 S.W 729, 730 (Ky. 1927).
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agreement and it cannot contain false representations concermng
the size of the decedent's estate. 332
KRS section 392.090(2) bars the surviving spouse from claim-
ing the personalty exemption if the survivor voluntarily left the
decedent and lived in adultery without afterwards becoming
reconciled with the decedent. An absolute divorce bars the sur-
viving former spouse from asserting any claim, including a claim
for the personalty exemption, m the decedent's estate.333 A di-
vorce from bed and board, however, does not bar the surviving
spouse's claim for assignment of the personalty exemption. 334
The surviving spouse does not lose the right to claim a personalty
exemption in the deceased spouse's estate merely because the
spouses were not living together when the decedent died.335 If
the surviving spouse moves to another state after the decedent's
death, she or he is not deprived of the personalty exemption. 3 6
KRS section 381.280 provides that the survivor forfeit all
interest in the decedent's property if the surviving spouse kills
the decedent and is convicted of the the felony 337 Tis statutory
forfeiture provision for murder also bars a child who was con-
victed of felomously killing its parent from claiming the person-
alty exemption when there is no surviving spouse.
KRS section 392.100 expressly provides for the immediate
forfeiture of the bigamous spouse's dower rights in the first
spouse's estate. This civil penalty for a bigamy conviction does
not expressly authorize forfeiture of the bigamous spouse's right
to claim the personalty exemption in the first spouse's estate.
However, it is clear that neither party in a bigamous marriage
may claim the personalty exemption in the other's estate whether
1,2 Rudd v. Rudd, 214 S.W 791, 794 (Ky. 1919) (settlement agreement between
surviving spouse and one of the decedent's heirs in which the survivor relinquished all
claims in the decedent's estate became invalid because the heir had no authority to
represent the other heirs, no consideration supported the agreement and it was based on
false representations as to the value of the decedent's estate).
333 KRS § 392.090(1) (1984).
Id. at § 403.050.
335 International Harvester Co., 178 S.W.2d at 969 (surviving spouse residing m
another state apart from the decedent at the time of decedent's death); Meyers' Adm'r,
50 S.W.2d at 82 (surviving spouse permanently residing apart from the decedent at the
time of decedent's death).
33 O'Hara, 206 S.W at 462.
337 KRS § 381.280 (emphasis added).
[VOL. 76
FAmi.Y PROTECTION
or not there was a bigamy conviction. In Cox v Monday,338 the
claimant was denied any marital rights in the decedent's estate,
including a claim of the personalty exemption. The claimant had
been married to another at the time of her marriage to the
decedent. Therefore, the marriage was void and the claimant
was not the decedent's surviving spouse.
F Relationship of the Personalty Exemption to Dower/Curtesy
and Other Rights of the Surviving Spouse
If the decedent dies intestate as to some or all of her or his
personal property, the surviving spouse may claim the personalty
exemption. 339 The exemption is in addition to any other rights
the survivor may have m the decedent's intestate estate. There-
fore, the surviving spouse may receive both the exemption and
dower 340 No inconsistency exists between KRS section
391.030(1)(c), which grants a personalty exemption to the sur-
viving spouse, and KRS section 392.020, which gives the surviv-
ing spouse one-half of the decedent's surplus personalty as part
of the survivor's dower share in the decedent's estate. 341 The
"surplus" personalty mentioned in KRS section 392.020 is the
personalty remaining after the personalty exemption, funeral
expenses and debts have been deducted from the gross personalty
the decedent possessed at the time of death.
If the decedent left a gift to the surviving spouse in a will
which does not dispose of all of the decedent's personalty, the
survivor may claim the personalty exemption in the undisposed
intestate personalty in addition to the will gift. 342 However, if
the deceased spouse died totally testate as to her or his personal
property, the surviving spouse is not entitled to the personalty
exemption.343 Since 1982, a surviving spouse who renounces the
will and takes a renounced share pursuant to KRS section 392.080
may not claim the personalty exemption. 344
3 95 S.W.2d 785 (Ky. 1936).
", KRS § 391.030(1).
'" Blades, 159 S.W.2d at 408.
'42 Talbott's Ex*r v. Goetz, 151 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Ky. 1941).
3 Weddington, 54 S.W.2d at 332.
-"' Shaw v. Gnmes, 218 S.W 447, 450 (Ky. 1919).
3" 1982 Ky. Acts 277, § 7.
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A tax exemption similar to the personalty exemption is avail-
able to a surviving spouse, or if there is no surviving spouse, to
the decedent's children who take pursuant to the terms of the
decedent's will. KRS section 140.064 provides that when a person
dies testate as to her or his personal estate, the surviving spouse,
or surviving children if there is no spouse, may apply to the
district court for an order exempting from inheritance or estate
tax up to $7,500 of testator's personal property This exemption
has no significance to a surviving spouse. Since 1985, the total
inheritable interest of the surviving spouse has been exempted
from the payment of any inheritance and estate tax.3 4s However,
the decedent's children are taxed on any inheritance they receive
in excess of $5,000. 46 Thus, if there is no surviving spouse, the
$7,500 personalty exemption that KRS section 140.064 confers
on the decedent's children coupled with the $5,000 exemption in
KRS section 140.080(2)-(4) shelters $12,500 of personalty from
taxation.
G. Children's Rights to the Personalty Exemption
Before 1974, the decedent's surviving spouse and infant chil-
dren shared the personalty exemption.347 If the decedent's infant
children lived with the surviving spouse, the exempt property
was treated as vesting in the surviving spouse for the benefit of
the surviving spouse and the decedent's infant children.314 If the
surviving spouse remarried and thereafter died without having
disposed of the exempt property, the infant children, not the
new spouse, took the remaining exempt property 149 Similarly,
when only the decedent's infant children took the exempt prop-
erty because there was no surviving spouse, if one child died
then that child's share passed to the other children. It did not
pass to the deceased child's administrator. 30 The exempt prop-
erty was divided between the surviving spouse and infant children
34' 1985 Ky. Acts 6, § 12 (excerpts from Special Session).
- KRS § 140.080(1)(c), (2)-(4) (Supp. 1986).
347 1974 Ky. Acts 299, § 2.
-'4 Price v. Nichols, 12 Ky. L. Rptr. 421 (1890).
349 Id. at 421-22.
I" Wilson, 50 S.W at 684.
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only if the infant children did not live with the surviving spouse.351
Today, the problem of when and how to divide the person-
alty exemption between the decedent's surviving spouse and in-
fant children has been elirmnated because the decedent's children
may share in the exemption only if there is no surviving spouse. 352
As the children no longer have any claim to the exemption if a
spouse survives the decedent, the subsequent death of the sur-
viving spouse does not give the children any claim to the exempt
property that the survivor died owmng.
In Wilson v. Parson's Administrator,353 an infant's estate
consisting solely of the infant's share of the proceeds of the
personalty exemption and of rent from the homestead passed to
the decedent's surviving infant child. It did not go to the ad-
rmmstrator of the deceased child's estate. The Wilson court
based its decision on the idea that the legislature wanted infant
children to consume the exempt property for their support. The
legislative purpose of the personalty exemption is no longer one
of support of infant children because the exemption is now
conferred upon both the decedent's adult and infant children. 35 4
Therefore, if one of the decedent's children later dies, the sur-
viving children should have no claim to the deceased child's
share of the personalty exemption.
The effect of the surviving spouse's waiver or relinquishment
of the personalty exemption in an antenuptial or postnuptial
contract on the children's right to claim the exemption remains
unclear. If a waiving spouse is treated as if she or he had
predeceased the decedent, the children could claim the exemp-
tion. In Brown v Brown's Administrator,3-5 Kentucky's highest
"I Allen v. Allen's Adm'r, 91 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Ky. 1936) (division ordered because
surviving spouse returned to live with parents, and the infant children by the decedent's
first spouse went to live with their grandparents); Wheeldon's Adm'r v. Barrett's Guard-
ian, 70 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Ky. 1934) (division ordered because both the infant child and
surviving spouse married prior to settlement of the decedent's estate); Landrum v.
Landrum, 218 S.W 717, 718 (Ky. 1920) (division ordered because surviving spouse
moved to boarding house and stored exempt property while the infant children lived
elsewhere); Eversole v. Eversole, 185 S.W 487, 489 (Ky. 1916) (division ordered because
surviving spouse was in prison).
3- KRS § 391.030(1)(c).
3 50 S.W 684 (Ky. 1899).
34 1982 Ky. Acts 51, § 1.
355 80 S.W 470 (Ky. 1904).
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court held that an antenuptial contract waiving the personalty
exemption was binding on the surviving spouse, but it did not
interfere with, or defeat, the rights of the infant children to the
exemption. However, that case does not dispose of the issue
because the court decided the case under the exemption statute
when it exempted the property for the "widow or infant chil-
dren. ' ' 356 Under a literal interpretation of the contemporary stat-
ute, the children are not entitled to claim the exemption unless
the decedent dies without a surviving spouse.
Even if the courts decide to follow the decision in the Brown
case concerning the effect of an antenuptial or postnuptial con-
tract on the children's right to the personalty exemption, the
decedent's children should not be entitled to claim the exemption
when the surviving spouse relinquishes any claim to the person-
alty exemption in a settlement agreement after the decedent's
death. Conceptually, an antenuptial or postnuptial waiver pre-
vents the exempt property from ever vesting in the surviving
spouse. However, when the surviving spouse enters into a settle-
ment agreement after the decedent's death, the spouse relin-
quishes a presently existing property interest in exchange for
something else of value. Tis relinquishment is no different than
if the surviving spouse were to choose to sell the exempt property
after the decedent's death. In either case, the children would
have no claim to the exemption.
The problem of the right of the decedent's children to claim
the exemption also arises if the surviving spouse is barred from
claiming the exemption because of rmsconduct such as adul-
tery,357 bigamy,358 or murder. 359 If the surviving spouse is con-
victed of murdering the decedent, KRS section 381.280, the
forfeiture statute, specifically provides that the property interest
forfeited descends to the decedent's other heirs-at-law Conse-
quently, the children may claim the personalty exemption as if
the spouse had not survived the decedent. The statutes imposing
forfeiture penalties on adulterous or bigamous spouses do not
direct expressly the distribution of the forfeited rights. Logically,
3M 1869 Ky. Acts 785, § 2.
KRS § 392.090(2).
Id. at § 392.100 (1984).
359 Id. at § 381.280.
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and for the sake of consistency, a surviving spouse who suffers
a statutorily imposed forfeiture of inheritance rights because of
misconduct should be treated as having predeceased the dece-
dent. In such cases, the children could claim the personalty
exemption in addition to their share as the decedent's primary
intestate takers.
The children are entitled to the exemption if the decedent
received an absolute divorce from her or his spouse prior to
death. KRS section 392.090(1) mandates this result. It expressly
states that an absolute divorce bars all claims of either wife or
husband to the real and personal property of the other after her
or his death. As an absolute divorce completely severs the marital
relationship, a divorced decedent has no surviving spouse.
H. Family Allowance
No statutory provisions exist in Kentucky for granting a
family, or living allowance to the decedent's surviving spouse or
minor children during the period of estate admimstration. 360
However, as other states do provide such living allowances, the
Kentucky courts have had to determine how to administer the
estate of a Kentucky domiciliary whose spouse may claim a
family allowance under the laws of another state.
In Mann v Peoples-Liberty Bank & Trust Co.,361 the surviv-
ing spouse of a Kentucky domiciliary was entitled to a living
allowance under an Ohio statute. Oluo law authorized its probate
court to grant a living allowance to a nonresident surviving
spouse chargeable against real property located in Ohio. In
distributing the decedent's real property located in Kentucky and
all of the decedent's personalty, the Kentucky court did not
offset the amount the surviving spouse received as a living al-
lowance under Ohio law against the amounts the spouse was
entitled to under Kentucky law
3w See, e.g., UPC § 2-403 (1982). In addition to a homestead allowance and
personalty exemption, the UPC provides for the payment from the estate of a reasonable
monetary allowance for the benefit of the surviving spouse and certain minor and
dependent children.
-1 256 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1953).
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In Short v Galway,362 the decedent was an Ohio domiciliary
with land in Kentucky The surviving spouse obtained a lien
against the decedent's land in Kentucky from an Ohio court.
The lien was to secure payment of a family allowance to the
surviving spouse equal to one year's support. The Kentucky
courts refused to treat the lien as an enforceable encumbrance
against the decedent's land in Kentucky The encumbrance was
not created by contract, but by a statute which evidenced Ohio's,
not Kentucky's, public policy of securing a living allowance to
a decedent's surviving spouse. Kentucky does not subject a de-
cedent's real property to any encumbrance in favor of the sur-
viving spouse except the homestead allowance.3 63 If the Kentucky
courts had enforced the Ohuo lien against the decedent's real
property located in Kentucky, Ohio law, not Kentucky law,
would control the descent of real property This result would
offend the universally recognized choice of law principle that
the law of the situs of "immovables" determines every question
concerning those assets of the decedent. 64
III. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
The preceding discussions demonstrate that both the home-
stead and personalty exemptions currently available in Kentucky
are inadequate to protect the decedent's family from the eco-
nomic hardships caused by the death of a spouse or parent. The
exemptions do not adequately address the immediate needs of
the decedent's family during the period of estate administration.
Nor do the current exemptions assure that the decedent's family
will enter the post-probate period with sufficient assets to start
a new life without the decedent's economic contribution.
The following statutes are proposed as a solution to the
problems currently associated with Kentucky's family protection
devices. The interim family allowance statute is modeled on the
family allowance provisions in the Uniform Probate Code 65 but
36 83 Ky. 501 (1886).
3- See KRS § 427.060-.100 (1970 & Supp. 1986).
See Gaskins v. Gaskins, 223 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Ky. 1949) (intestate realty located
in Kentucky is not subject to a surviving spouse's lien acquired in the state of the
decedent's domicile).
- UPC § 2-403.
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with significant modifications to insure that the family's imme-
diate support needs are adequately addressed. A single post-
probate allowance combining features of the Uniform Probate
Code's homestead allowance'66 and personalty exemption 67 is
proposed to replace Kentucky's current homestead and person-
alty exemptions.
1. Interim Family Allowance
1. The surviving spouse, minor children and dependent chil-
dren of a decedent who was domiciled in Kentucky are entitled
to a reasonable allowance in money out of the estate of the
decedent for their maintenance during the period of adminis-
tration. The allowance may not be paid for longer than one
year if the estate is inadequate to discharge all allowed claims.
2. The allowance is exempt from and has priority over all
claims, including the post-probate allowance and the expenses
of administration, against the estate except the claims of se-
cured creditors in their collateral.
3. The interim family allowance is not chargeable against
any share passing to the surviving spouse or minor or depend-
ent child by the will of the decedent, by right of dower under
KRS. § 392.020, by renunciation under KRS § 392.080, or by
intestate succession.
4. The personal representative may determine, without prior
court approval, a family allowance in a lump sum not exceed-
ing the annual minimum federal poverty guideline for the same
size family [including minor or dependent children not living
with the surviving spouse], or periodic monthly installments
not exceeding one-twelfth of that amount. Prior court approval
is required for the payment of any family allowance in excess
of this amount or for any term of payment in excess of one
year
5. The allowance may be paid to the surviving spouse for
the use of the surviving spouse and minor and dependent
children living with the surviving spouse. Part of the allowance
may be paid to any minor or dependent children not living
with the surviving spouse, to the guardian of such children, or
to the person having the care and custody of such children as
the children's needs may appear. If there is no surviving spouse,
Id. at § 2-401.
"' Id. at § 2-402.
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the allowance is payable to the minor and dependent children
or to the persons having their care and custody
6. The personal representative or the court must take into
account the following factors in determining the amount of
the interim family allowance:
a. the claimant's previous standard of living;
b. the amount and nature of other resources available
to meet the claimant's current living expenses including, but
not limited to, income of the claimant; insurance proceeds
payable immediately to the claimant; assets transferred m-
tervivos by decedent to the claimant or to the use of the
claimant; and the claimant's capital assets.
7 The personal representative or any interested person ag-
grieved by any selection, determination, payment, proposed
payment, or failure to act under this section may petition the
district court for appropriate relief, which relief may provide
a family allowance larger or smaller than that which the per-
sonal representative determined or could have determined.
8. The death of any person entitled to the family allowance
terminates that person's right to allowances not yet paid.
The purpose of the interim family allowance is to provide
for the immediate needs of the decedent's family which cannot
otherwise be met during the period of estate administration.
Need is a relative concept which must be determined in light of
the particular claimant's circumstances. Therefore, the allowance
is expressed in terms of a "reasonable" allowance rather than a
fixed, dollar amount.
In addition to the surviving spouse, the decedent's minor
and dependent children also may share in the interim family
allowance. The inclusion of "dependent" children extends the
protection of the interim family allowance to adult children who
actually suffer immediate adverse economic consequences be-
cause of their actual dependence upon the decedent; nondepen,
dent adult children's claims are elimnated. All of the decedent's
minor children are included within the class of claimants without
regard to actual dependency to provide a needed continuation
of the parental obligation of support and education for all of
the decedent's minor children.
The money payable to the claimants pursuant to the interim
family allowance has priority over all claims against the dece-
dent's estate except secured creditors who have a lien or mort-
gage against some of the decedent's real or personal property
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However, if the secured creditor's collateral is not sufficient to
satisfy the indebtedness, the interim family allowance has pri-
ority over any deficiency claim of the secured creditor against
the decedent's estate. The claims of unsecured creditors, will
beneficiaries, and intestate takers are also jumor to the interim
family allowance. The statute specifically makes the interim al-
lowance superior to the expenses of adminstration because tra-
ditionally administration costs are given priority over all other
claims against the decedent's estate.3 6 There is no justification
for treating unsecured claims arising out of the period of estate
administration any differently than unsecured claims which arose
before the debtor's death. In either case, creditors' valid claims
are made secondary to the decedent's family's more compelling
claim for assistance during the estate adminstration period.
The term "claims" as used in the statute is intended to
include all liabilities whether they arose in tort, contract, or
otherwise before or after the decedent's death. Estate or inher-
itance taxes, however, are not included within the term. The
priority granted to the interim family allowance may adversely
affect the ability of unsecured creditors to obtain satisfaction of
their debts from the decedent's estate. Therefore, if the estate is
inadequate to discharge all the allowed claims, a maximum
allowance period of one year is imposed.
As the purpose of the interim family allowance is to guar-
antee that the claimant's day-to-day needs are met immediately
after the decedent's death, the personal representative, without
a court order, has the power to award funds to the claimants.
However, a monetary cap is placed upon the personal represen-
tative's discretionary award. The maximum perlmssible amount
of a non-court approved interim family allowance award equals
a lump-sum award which does not exceed the annual minmum
federal poverty guideline for the same size family369 or periodic
3" Talbott's Ex'r v. Goetz, 151 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Ky. 1941); Towery v. McGraw,
56 S.W 727, 728 (Ky. 1900), overruled, Palmer v. Turner, 43 S.W.2d 1017, 1020 (Ky.
1931).
30 The Social Security Admimstration originated the poverty index in 1964. The
poverty thresholds are updated every year and reflect changes m the Consumer Price
Index. The poverty thresholds reflect the different needs of families based on differences
in family size and composition. For example, m 1985 the poverty threshold for a family
of three persons was $8,573, whereas the threshold for a family of four persons was
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monthly installments not exceeding one-twelfth of that amount.
If the personal representative chooses to pay the amount in
monthly installments, the maximum permissible duration of such
payments without court approval is one year even if the estate
is large enough to meet all the allowed claims. In computing the
nummum federal poverty guideline amount, all of the claimants,
regardless of whether they live together, are counted to determine
the size of the family.
The use of a fixed cap on the amount that the personal
representative can pay as an interim family allowance is re-
jected.370 A fixed cap expressed as an absolute dollar amount
guarantees that the allowance will eventually become obsolete.
Expressing the cap in relationship to the federally established
poverty guidelines permits the cap to change without any further
legislative action if the cost of living changes. The federally
established poverty guideline was adopted as the measure of this
flexible cap because it provides the same floor as that thought
necessary for the subsistence of any family in the United States.
The allowance is in addition to any share passing to the
claimants by right of intestate succession, by virtue of the sur-
viving spouse's dower rights under KRS section 392.020, or by
way of the surviving spouse's renounced share under KRS section
392.080. The only way the allowance can fulfill its purpose of
addressing the immediate needs of the decedent's family during
the period of estate administration is if it is awarded without
reference to the amount the claimants will receive in the admin-
istration of the decedent's estate. Regardless of whether the
claimant will receive a significant or insignificant inheritance as
a surviving spouse, will beneficiary, or intestate taker of the
decedent, the immediate needs of day-to-day living must still be
met.
The Uniform Probate Code provision for a family allowance
permits the testator to make a will gift to a potential claimant
in lieu of any or all the family allowance the will beneficiary
would receive under the family allowance provision.371 However,
$10,989. U.S. DEPAR mmr OF COMERCE, BuRAsu oF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES 1987 415-16 (107th ed. 1987).
370 The Uniform Probate Code establishes a fixed cap of $6,000. UPC § 2-404.
-1' Id. at § 2-403.
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the decedent cannot use a will gift in lieu of the family allowance
to limit the beneficiary to an amount below the statutory mim-
mum to which she or he would be entitled under the family
allowance provision of the Code.
The Code's drafters use the family allowance to address not
only the needs of the decedent's family immediately after the
decedent's death, but also to preclude total, intentional disin-
heritance of the claimants. Family protection devices should
serve only one function-cushioning the adverse economic con-
sequences of the decedent's death on those who were financially
dependent on the decedent. If the legislature wants to protect a
testator's children from intentional disinheritance by will, that
problem should be addressed directly by a statute drafted to
guarantee a minimum forced share for the decedent's children.
It should not be dealt with under the guise of a family allowance.
The interim family allowance statute proposed in this Article
has only one purpose to fulfill-guaranteeing a minmum level
of econormc well-being pending the adnumstration of the dece-
dent's estate. That goal is accomplished by guaranteeing that if
the claimants need an interim family allowance award to see
them through the probate period, it is available to them on the
basis of this need regardless of whether, or how, they might
take from the decedent's estate after the administration period.
If the decedent dies with a surviving spouse and children
eligible to claim the family allowance and those children live
with the surviving spouse, the interim family allowance is pay-
able to the surviving spouse for the use of all the claimants. In
such a case, the surviving spouse knows best the needs of the
family members involved. However, as the decedent's family
may not be organized in the traditional family constellation of
a surviving spouse who is the parent and custodian of all the
decedent's minor and dependent children, the personal admin-
istrator may divide the allowance among the claimants. If a
minor or dependent child does not live with the surviving spouse,
the personal representative or the court may apportion the al-
lowance between the surviving spouse and those children accord-
ing to the claimants' respective needs. If there is no surviving
spouse, but children exist who qualify for the interim family
allowance, those children, or the persons having the care and
custody of the children, may receive the allowance directly
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The actual amount awarded under the interim family allow-
ance statute must be determined in light of the facts and circum-
stances of the particular claimants. The allowance should cushion
the immediate economic consequences of the decedent's death
only if the claimants actually cannot meet their day-to-day living
expenses. Consequently, claimants are not entitled to an intenm
family allowance if the decedent's death does not actually have
an adverse effect on their ability to meet their day-to-day living
expenses.
In deternuning whether the claimants are entitled to an al-
lowance and, if so how much, the personal representative and
the court must take into account the standard of living the
claimants enjoyed prior to the decedent's death. This determi-
nation assures that the claimants do not experience extreme
necessity before they qualify to receive a family allowance. They
are eligible for an allowance during the period of estate admin-
istration if the decedent's death causes them to suffer a decline
in their accustomed standard of living. The claimants' accus-
tomed standard of living includes their need for food, shelter,
clothing, and health care as well as the payment of regularly
recurring expenses such as utility payments and debt service
payments that arise dunng the administration period.
The personal representative and the court must take into
account the claimants' ability to continue to enjoy their previous
standard of living through the decedent's nonprobate assets and
the claimants' own personal assets available to the family during
the admnistration period. Thus, provisions made by the dece-
dent to meet the immediate support needs of the family through
life insurance payable to the claimants either in a lump sum or
periodically during the period of estate administration may de-
crease, if not eliminate, any award of an interim family allow-
ance. Similarly, the decedent may have anticipated that the
disruption caused by her or his death might hamper the claim-
ants' ability to continue to enjoy their previous standard of
living and may have provided for them by way of intervivos
transfers such as a trust. Such currently available assets must be
taken into account in determimmg the appropriateness and size
of a family allowance payment. If the claimants have sufficient
available assets, such as income from their employment or suf-
ficiently liquid capital, to maintain their day-to-day living stan-
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dard, then they would not receive an interim family allowance.
The interim family allowance is not a claim of a right in the
surviving spouse and children. The allowance is limited to claim-
ants who actually need it because any amounts paid to the
claimants may adversely affect valid claims of the decedent's
general creditors. The state's interest in providing protection to
needy claimants justifies overriding the legitimate claims of the
decedent's creditors. No such justification exists, however, for
defeating creditors' claims when the family actually does not
need support. For that reason, the right to receive payments
pursuant to the interim family allowance statute terminates upon
the death of a claimant.
Any person aggrieved by any determination the personal
representative makes concermng the award of an interim family
allowance may petition the district court for relief from that
determination. Thus, if the claimants are demed an allowance
or awarded an allowance they believe is insufficient under the
facts, they may petition the court to set a higher amount. Con-
versely, the decedent's creditors who will be adversely affected
by an award of a family allowance may petition the court or
intervene in the claimants' petition to object to the amount as
"unreasonable" under the circumstances.
2. Post-Probate Allowance
1. A surviving spouse of a decedent who was domiciled in
Kentucky is entitled to a post-probate allowance of $12,500.
If there is no surviving spouse, each minor child and each
dependent child of the decedent is entitled to a post-probate
allowance amounting to $12,500 divided by the number of
minor and dependent children of the decedent. The post-pro-
bate allowance is exempt from and has priority over all claims
against the estate except the interim family allowance and the
claims of secured creditors in their collateral.
2. If the estate is otherwise sufficient, property specifically
devised is not used to satisfy a right to a post-probate allow-
ance. Subject to this restriction, the surviving spouse or the
guardians of minor and dependent children may select property
of the estate as the post-probate allowance. The personal rep-
resentative may make these selections if the surviving spouse,
or the guardians of the children are unable or fail to do so
within a reasonable time or if there is no guardian of the minor
children.
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3. The personal representative may execute an instrument
or deed of distribution to establish the ownership of property
taken as the post-administration allowance.
The post-probate allowance would replace the homestead
exemption and the personalty exemption with a single dollar
allowance in fee for the surviving spouse or for the decedent's
minor and dependent children if there is no surviving spouse.
Currently, Kentucky's personalty exemption is expressed in terms
of a single dollar amount. 372 The source of funding for the
current exemption is limited to personal property the decedent
died owmng. 373 Thus, if the decedent died owning insufficient
personal property to satisfy the personalty exemption, the claim-
ant could not look to the decedent's real property to make up
the deficiency. The proposed statute does not limit the funding
for the post-probate allowance to any particular part of the
decedent's estate.
Under Kentucky's current statutes, the homestead exemption
is too small and too restrictive to accomplish its purpose of
providing a home for the claimants after the decedent's death.
Today, when the national average price for an existing single
family home is in excess of $85,000,374 the lifetime use of $5,000
can neither shelter the decedent's residence from claims of cred-
itors nor secure another home for the claimants.
Because. Kentucky's probate homestead exemption derives
from the decedent's intervivos homestead exemption,375 it is only
available if the decedent's interest in the property she or he was
occupying at death as a residence was an inheritable interest.
Thus, if the decedent had only a life estate interest in the
property occupied as a residence prior to death, the decedent's
surviving spouse and infant children could not claim a probate
homestead exemption. This result is anomolous because the sur-
viving spouse and children of a life tenant have the same need
37'KRS § 391.030 (1984).
311 Id. at § 391.030(l)(c).
314 Information obtained from Kentucky Real Estate Education and Resource Cen-
ter, 102 A Mathews Building, Unversity of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky 40506-0471.
371 Runyon v. Runyon's Adm'x, 95 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Ky. 1936); Lear v. Lear, 28
S.W.2d 32, 33 (Ky. 1930); Little's Guardian v. Woodward, 77 Ky. 585, 587 (1879).
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for shelter after the life tenant's death as do the survivors of a
fee owner.
The current homestead exemption is rarely used because it
is an alternative to, and not m addition to, other rights the
surviving spouse has m the estate of the decedent such as dower.3 76
The dower share of the decedent's real property is a one-half
fee interest in all the surplus real estate the decedent died owning
and a life estate in one-third of the real property the decedent
owned during coverture, but not at the time of death.3 77 Thus,
the dower share is almost always more generous to the surviving
spouse than the probate homestead exemption.
Replacing the homestead and personalty exemptions with a
single post-probate allowance recognizes that today a legislature
will not grant a large enough homestead exemption to guarantee
shelter for the claimants. Therefore, a post-probate allowance is
proposed to provide the claimants with an amount of money in
fee that the claimant may use in any manner to help start anew.
Individual situations are so vaned that it makes no sense to
assume that all claimants have the same economic needs as they
enter the post-adminstration period. The fixed-dollar, post-pro-
bate allowance provides needed flexibility while assuring that the
claimant has at least a mmimum amount at her or his disposal
regardless of what the claimant received by way of inheritance
from the decedent's estate.
The fixed-dollar amount of the post-probate allowance acts
to establish a point below which the procedures for admimstra-
tion of a small estate are-triggered. KRS section 395.455 provides
that the court may dispense with the administration of the estate
if the exemption and preferred claims exceed the amount of.
probatable assets. Thus, if the decedent died owning only $12,500
worth of assets, no administration of the estate would be re-
quired and the court could order the estate transferred to the
376 The, following cases indicate that the vdow must elect. Berger v. Berger, 94
S.W.2d 618, 620 (Ky. 1936); Thompson v. Thompson's Adm'r, 105 S.W 1185, 1188
(Ky. 1907); Redmond's Adm'x v. Redmond, 66 S.W 745, 747 (Ky. 1902); Freeman v.
Mills, 59 S.W 3, 5 (Ky. 1900); Funk v. Walters, 12 Ky. Op. 618 (1877); Donaldson v.
Donaldson's Adm'r, 9 Ky. Op. 618 (1877). The following cases indicate that the widower
must elect. Sams v. Sampson, 255 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Ky. 1953); Carpenter v. Hazelngg,
45 S.W 666, 667 (Ky. 1898).
-n KRS § 392.020 (1984).
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surviving spouse or to the decedent's minor and dependent chil-
dren if there is no surviving spouse.
The surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary of the post-
probate allowance while the decedent's children only have a
claim to it if there is no surviving spouse and the children are
minors or dependent. This solution avoids all of the problems
associated with forcing the surviving spouse to share an allow-
ance with the children. Kentucky's current personalty exemption
is similarly available to the decedent's children only if there is
no surviving spouse. 378 The allowance claimants are patterned
after the perrmssible claimants under Kentucky's current person-
alty exemption statute, but with two changes. Under the pro-
posed statute, children who are actually dependent on the
decedent, regardless of age, share with minor children who are
legally dependents of the decedent if no surviving spouse exists,
and non-dependent adult children may not share in the allow-
ance.
The priority of the post-probate allowance is the same as
that granted to the interim family allowance. As between the
two allowances, however, the interim family allowance has pn-
ority over the post-probate allowance. In determimng the pri-
orities between these two allowances, guaranteeing the claimants
an ability to meet their immediate needs upon the death of the
decedent is more important than providing a small nest egg to
permit the claimant to start anew after the admimstration of the
decedent's estate.
Although the post-probate allowance is expressed in terms
of a fixed dollar amount, the proposed statute provides for the
claimant to take the allowance in kind out of the decedent's
estate. Therefore, if the claimants neither need nor want $12,500
in cash, they may choose to take items of personal property and
real property in the same dollar amount as the cash allowance.
The right to in-kind payment of this allowance is limited, how-
ever, because such an election could disrupt the distributive
scheme of a testator who made specific bequests to beneficiaries
under a will. When the decedent's estate has other assets suffi-
cient to satisfy the right to a post-probate allowance, the claim-
3, KRS § 391.030.
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ant may not select specifically devised property to satisfy the
allowance. Because the claimant may take the-allowance in the
form of distribution in kind, the statute grants the personal
representative the power to execute any instrument necessary to
establish the claimant's ownership of the property by assigning,
transferring, or releasing the asset to the claimant.
The post-probate allowance avoids the pitfalls associated
with the homestead exemption currently available under Ken-
tucky law by substituting an allowance in fee in place of a life
estate in property not exceeding $5,000 in value used as the
decedent's residence. The proposed statute retains the form of
the personalty exemption currently available in Kentucky but
removes the limitations the current law imposes on the exemp-
tion.
The post-probate allowance is expressed as a single $12,500
allowance because nothing is gained from the continued treat-
ment of a homestead allowance and a personalty exemption
payable in cash as separate claims against the decedent's estate.
Once a homestead allowance is substituted for the traditional
homestead exemption, it has the same purpose and effect as the
personalty exemption. Both provide the claimant a small nest
egg with which to begin rebuilding once the decedent's estate
has been settled. The only question is what amount ought to be
sheltered under the post-probate allowance. The figure of $12,500
is proposed because if Kentucky's current homestead exemption
were a fee interest in $5,000, and if it were combined with the
currently existing personalty exemption of $7,500, the total
amount exempted would be $12,500. A higher figure certainly
could be justified, today, but $12,500 has been determined by
the legislature to be an appropriate amount.
CONCLUSION
Kentucky's statutorily created family protection devices, the
homestead and personalty exemptions, do not protect the dece-
dent's family from the economic hardships caused by the death
of a spouse or parent. For example, the homestead exemption,
a life use of $5,000 awarded m lieu of the surviving spouse's
dower claim, is too small in its amount and too restricted in its
availability to provide shelter for the decedent's family Ken-
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tucky's current personalty exemption functions more effectively
than the homestead exemption in cushiomng the economic im-
pact of the decedent's death,. but it too is burdened by restric-
tions that limit its usefulness as a family protection device. For
example, if the decedent's estate does not contain sufficient
personalty assets to pay the entire exemption, the decedent's real
property is not available to fund the deficiency. Currently, no
statutory provisions exist in Kentucky for granting a family or
living allowance during the period of estate admnistration to
the surviving spouse or to minor children of the decedent.
The interim family allowance proposed in this Article would
provide assistance, if needed, to a decedent's family while the
decedent's estate is being administered. The allowance is a flex-
ible mechanism for addressing the immediate needs of the de-
cedent's family that cannot be otherwise met. It is carefully
tailored to fulfill just this protective function. The interim allow-
ance is awarded without reference to any amount the claimants
might receive from the decedent's estate because the ability of
the claimants to meet their immediate day-to-day living expenses
is not contingent upon the share the claimant will receive when
the administration of the decedent's estate is finally completed.
However, to insure that the allowance benefits only those claim-
ants who have actually suffered immediate adverse effects on
their ability to meet their day-to-day living expenses, the allow-
ance is not a claim of right to a fixed amount in the surviving
spouse or the decedent's children. The actual amount of the
allowance is determined by reference to both the claimant's
previous standard of living and assets actually available for the
claimant's use during the period of estate admimstration. If there
are no unmet needs, no allowance is awardable.
Kentucky's homestead and personalty exemptions are com-
bined into a single $12,500 post-probate allowance in this pro-
posal for reform. A post-probate allowance avoids the possibility
that exists with the current personalty exemption that the dece-
dent's gross estate nught be large enough to fund the exemption,
but the exemption is not available to-the claimant because the
decedent's assets are in the form of real, not personal, property.
The proposed allowance is payable from either the decedent's
personal or real property. Unlike the current homestead exemp-
tion which is only available to those surviving spouses who
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renounce their dower share, the post-probate allowance is in
addition to any share to which the surviving spouse might oth-
erwise be entitled.
Adoption of the reforms proposed in this Article will result
m a real protection of the decedent's family during the period
of estate administration. The reforms also will insure that every
claimant who has suffered the loss of a spouse or parent will
enter the post-probate period with a small amount of money
with which to meet the claimant's particular needs. The state's
legitimate concern in cushioning the economic impact of death
on the survivors is more fairly and adequately addressed under
these proposals than they are under Kentucky's current family
protection devices.

